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History

MiG 6 O ’clock High
A History o f the Design Bureau and an Analysis o f its Aircrafts Combat History
Chairperson: Harry Fritz
MiG is known throughout the worldwide lexicon as synonymous with Soviet
airpower. Its history is as decorated as the aircraft it has produced, yet the
challenges faced by the fall o f the Soviet Union may collapse this once proud
company. While its future remains unclear, the history o f both MiG OKB, and the
role its aircraft have played in combat, is clouded in mystery and intrigue.
Among Western military historians, MiG aircraft have l?een regarded as secondrate, a generation behind their Western counterparts. Since the end o f World War
II, many M iG’s have been downed by the guns o f Western aircraft. Many believe
this to be proof positive o f their inferiority. There is a danger in this assumption,
both for historian and strategists alike given that, aside from the air war in Korea,
MiG’s have never operated in an environment for which they were designed.
Conflicts since Korea have placed MiG’s in an environment far removed from
their intended role. Had they been utilized in the regimental sized formations
against NATO forces in Europe and with the support o f a well trained GCI and
C3 network, the MiG might perhaps be regarded differently.
This thesis will examine the history and nature o f the MiG OKB as well as the
environment o f Soviet military hardware acquisition. This study will enable an
understanding o f a military hardware infrastructure far different than existed in
the West during the Cold War. Furthermore, four cases studies o f conflicts in
which M iG’s faced Western aircraft will be examined. These case studies will
elucidate key issues MiG’s have faced as well as the reasons for both their failure
and success. Examples o f successes include iimovative tactics during Vietnam
and high pilot proficiency during Korea, while the failures include poor C3
networks over the Bekka Valley and in Gulf War I. However, the overriding
theme o f the case studies is pilot skill, or the lack thereof.
The goal o f this work is not to redeem the view of MiG in the eyes o f Western
historians, rather too illuminate the key issues responsible for successful air
combat.
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Introduction

MiG! The abbreviation o f the Mikoyan and Gurevich design bureau has
become synonymous with any fighter aircraft built by the Soviet Union during the
Cold War. Within Russia and Poland the word has entered gone beyond the
spectrum o f aircraft and has entered the colloquial lexicon; it is applied to
anything that is unusually swift or flashy.^ This association is not accidental. For
over forty years MiG has the premiere fighter bureau o f the Soviet Union/Russia.
M iG’s fame beginning with the MiG-1, designed in a time o f seemingly
impending doom during the Patriotic War and continuing to this day vsdth the
MiG-29, has survived even the founding designers’ deaths in the 1970’s. Its work
has consistently represented the state of the art technology o f the Soviet Union,
whether it be the nimble MiG-3 over the skies o f Eastern Europe or the lightning
fast MiG-25 over Siberia and Israel.
Until recently, MiG has enjoyed a level of recognition and prominence
realized by no other aircraft design bureau the world over. Only in today’s
capitalistic Russia has MiG begun to fall from its pillar o f grace. A free market
economy is doing what NATO never got a chance to by destroying the foremost
design bureau o f the Soviet Union. But understanding MiG’s rapid ascension to
prominence is futile without a concise history o f the Soviet/Russian Air Force
from inception to present day.

^Butowski, Piotr and Miller, Jay OKB MiG: A History o f the Design Bureau and Its Aircraft pg 5

C hapter I

Brief History o f the Soviet Air Force^

It is claimed that Russia’s interest in military aviation began in 1831
when the military governor o f Riazon attended the country’s first balloon flight.
Official acceptance within military circles came with the creation o f the creation
o f a Commission on the Use o f Aeronautics for Military Purposes, endorsed by
General D.A Mulituin in 1869.^ This commission investigated and eventually
accepted the role o f balloons as artillery spotting platforms. Throughout the latter
half o f the 19**^ century, various schools and training facilities were built to
achieve this end. The Russo-Japanese War validated the balloon as an effective
observation and reconnaissance platform.
Soon after the war, news o f the Wright brothers’ successful heavier-thanair flight in North Carolina reached Czar Nicholas II and his ministers. Since no
indigenous aircraft manufacturers existed in Russia at that time, the Czar ordered
aircraft and power plants were purchased from France. In addition, very few
Russian pilots were proficient enough to instruct new pilots. To learn and create a
cadre able to train future personnel, new Russian pilots and ground crewman were
sent to France. This relation with France dictated a reliance on fcHK*ga hardware
during the first years o f World War I.

^ The Soviet Navy also has a long and distinguished history o f aviation, including long range
bomber assets and since the latter part o f the 1970’s a small carrier based fleet. However, for the
purpose o f this paper the focus will be on the VV S because it is the main recipient o f MiG aircraft.
It should be noted that recently MiG has made its first foray into naval aviation with the carrier
based M iG -29K for the Indian N avy’s ex-Soviet K iev class aircraft carrier.
^ ibid pg 11

Russian aircraft performed poorly in the first years o f the Great War. In
part this was due to Russia’s lack o f domestically produced aircraft. Sourcing
spare parts for Russia’s fleet o f 250 aircraft in the early part of WWI was nearly
impossible. Domestically developed replacement were often far inferior to foreign
components. This led to nearly half o f Russia fleet o f 250 aircraft being
unserviceable at the outbreak of hostilities."^ Most o f these aircraft were used for
observation rather then combat, as were most planes in either side’s inventory.
The birth o f Russian fighter aviation can be traced to a July 4, 1916. In
response to German fighter effectiveness on the Western Front, the Soviet Union
began arming planes as fighters. The shining light of Russian aviation during this
period was the success o f Sikorsy’s Ilia Mur omet bomber. These bombers flew
an impressive 442 missions, delivered 2,000 bombs, took 7,000 photographs and
lost only three out o f a fleet of forty to hostile fire, an impressive deed.^ However
the fledgling Russian Air Force could not overcome its reliance on foreign made
aircraft or its poor maintenance record. By the Revolution of 1917, it was hardly
an effective fighting force.
After the Revolution o f 1917, the Soviets immediately began to overhaul
the air force. They renamed it the Red Army Aviadarm (Air Fleet) and place(^ it
under the control o f the army, a precedent that continues to this day. Newly
cleaned o f counter-revolutionaries, the Soviets used the new Soviet Air Fleet to
great effect during the Civil War. During the War with the Whites over 19,000
sorties were flown, 208,0001bs o f bombs were dropped as well as 19,0001bs of

ibid pg 12
^ ibid pg 14

^

propaganda leaflets. The Air Fleet was employed on all fronts during the war and
its success secured its continued funding and interest.
The Soviets sought to end their reliance on foreign built aircraft during the
1920’s. They invited German companies such as Junkers to build, and partially
man, factories inside the Soviet Union. In return the Germans found a way to get
around the restrictive Versailles treaty by secretly developing and testing aircraft
in Lipestk, 250 miles southwest o f Moscow. The deal proved fruitful for both
parties. The newly formed Soviet Air Force (VVS) gained experience and
hardware and the Germans, an opportunity to rebuild the Luftwaffe.
During this time relations on the Chinese border were souring, and
skirmishes broke out among border units. In 1929, thirty four VVS aircraft
participated in skirmishes along the border soundly defeating the Chinese in the
air and on the ground. This was one o f the first uses o f Soviet air power outside of
the borders o f the Soviet Union and its success would bode well for the VVS.^
However the Soviet Union’s success against the Chinese convinced the Japanese
to invade Manchuria to protect her northern flank, a move that would result in a
clash between Tokyo and Moscow.
War was also raged on the Iberian Peninsula. Franco and his Nationalist
forces threatened the Republicans, backed by the monarchy and in 1936 Stalin
delivered aid to the beleaguered Republican forces. Aid came in the form of
volunteer troops, tanks, munitions and aircraft. The Soviet aircraft industry had
been hard at work during the 1930’s producing such aircraft as the S B -2,1-15 and

^ Soviet airpower had also been employed during the punitive skirmishes wfffi^PoTkncf in 1920.

1-16. All o f these aircraft were improvements over previous designs, but were
rapidly becoming obsolete.
Hitler’s decision to send the famed Condor Legion of Me-109s, H e-111’s
and Ju-87’s to Spain in 1937 turned the tables rapidly. Losses soon became
prohibitively heavy. Stalin used this as an excuse to withdraw his support from
the International Brigade. During the same time, the Japanese invasion o f China
threatened Siberia. This forced Stalin to give material aid in the form o f munitions
and mercenaries to the Chinese, including aircraft and pilots who suffered heavily
under the guns o f Japanese Zeroes.
In the midst o f the war in Spain and the threat of Japanese invasion, Stalin
ignited ludicrous military purges. The VVS was not immune , such high ranking
officers as the Chief o f the VVS Yakov Alksnis and Leningrad Air Commissar
Lopatin were executed. By the time Germany and the Soviet Union invaded
Poland, nearly 75% o f the VVS senior officers had been shot.^ Not only was this
disastrous for the VVS, but it decimated the Soviet aircraft design bureaus, their
supporting government agencies and the factories.
With the signing o f the Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty on August 23 1939, the
Soviet Union was obligated to become a participant in the next war. When
German troops moved across the Polish fi'ontier on 1 September 1939, the Soviet
Union was unable to follow suit. It was not until September 18^ that Soviet forces
moved into their sector o f Poland. The Luftwaffe had already decimated the small
Polish Air Force and the VVS did little during the invasion. However, the next

7 ;

ibid pg 15

stage o f the war would find the VVS at the forefront. 3,000 aircraft were deployed
in support of the Soviet invasion o f Finland.
However the purges and lack o f progressive thinking in it ranks, coupled
with increasingly outdated aircraft proved disastrous for the VVS. Nearly one
third o f the deployed aircraft were destroyed, with the remaining two thirds
unable to operate effectively due to weather and enemy action. This poor showing
led to a re-organization o f the VVS into five new commands: the Long-Range
Bomber Aviation (Dal ’nebombardirvochnaia Aviatsiia or DBA), Air Reserve
Component (Avaitsiia osbogo naznacheniia or AON), Frontal Aviation { W S
Fronta), Army Aviation ( W S Armii) and Corps Aviation {Korpusnye
avaieskadril). The Soviet Air Force was still in the midst o f these reforms when
Hitler initiated Operation Barbarossa and invaded the Soviet Union on June 22,
1941.
Though Stalin had been warned o f the impeding invasion through his spy,
Richard Sorge in Tokyo, as well as several Western intelligence agencies, he
refused to accept the news. As a result Soviet aircraft were still lined up neatly on
the taxiways of the western approaches to the Soviet Union, making easy targets
for Luftwaffe Stuka dive bombers. During the first day alone 1,489 Soviet aircraft
were destroyed on the ground and within a week, 4,000 VVS aircraft had been
lost.^ The only good news was that pilot losses were relatively light, since most of
the aircraft had been on the ground when they were destroyed.
The Soviets did have new aircraft such as the high altitude MiG-3 and IL2 Shturmovik ground attack bombers. They were on par, technologically, with the
www.centennialofflight.gov/essays/Air_Power/Russia/AP21 .htm

Luftwaffe’s aircraft. The crews o f these aircraft were trained in the regimented
fashion o f the purges, however and failed to capitalize on their advantages, They
were easily picked off by the superior Luftwaffe pilots It was on the Eastern Front
that the highest kill tallies realized were achieved. Werner Molders flying an Me109 became the first pilot ever to surpass the 100 kill mark and Erich Hartmann
became the highest ranking ace ever with over 352 kills, all against Soviet
aircraft. It was not until the Battle o f Moscow that the VVS received any kind of
reprieve from the slaughter it was receiving from the guns o f Georings Luftwaffe.
The harshness o f the Russian winter eventually stopped the Wehrmacht
drive to Moscow in December of 1940. The Luftwaffe too was paralyzed. Engines
would not start, hands froze to tools and oil became thick. The VVS, invigorated
with reinforcements sent from the Far East Military District and Lend Lease
aircraft, began to seize the initiative and wrest control o f the skies firom the
Luftwaffe. The Battle for Moscow was the turning point in the air war over the
Eastern Front. Never again would the Luftwaffe to operate with such impunity.
Hitler, realizing he could not take Moscow, diverted his troops south into Ukraine
and towards the oil rich Caucuses.
Stalingrad became the epicenter o f the war. During the offensive to
encircle and trap the German Sixth Army, the Soviets massed 24 air divisions and
99 regiments in support of the pincher movement. The VVS conducted air support
for the army and fighter patrols over the city to hinder German re-supply efforts.
During the winter o f 1942-43 the VVS claimed over 1,100 Luftwaffe aircraft

destroyed.^ The VVS succeeded in cutting off the encircled German Army from
the air forcing General von Paulus to surrender on February 3, 1943. After
Stalingrad, the VVS never again lost control o f the skies over the front and
maintained nearly complete air superiority through mass numbers. More
importantly, the army had learned the lesson o f air support and fully half of the
missions flown by the VVS were in direct support o f ground troops. By late 1944,
German aircraft on the Eastern Front numbered 1,850, o f which less then 400
were fighters. In comparison the VVS had a strength of nearly 17,000 aircraft.
During Battle for Berlin, the finale of the war in Europe, the VVS flew over
91,000 sorties, destroying over 1,100 Luftwaffe aircraft with the claimed loss of
only 527.*®
With the fall o f Berlin and the end o f war with Germany, Stalin honored
the Yalta conference and on August 8 1945 he declared war on Japan. Soviet
forces decimated the Japanese in Manchuria and North Korea, making landings in
the Kuril and Shaklin islands as well. Japanese aircraft were no match for the
W S and suffered heavily. Japan surrendered on September 2, 1945 and the
greatest war the world had ever known came to an end. The statistics for the VVS
during the war were phenomenal. 3.8 million sorties were flown, nearly 700,000
tons o f bombs were dropped and 1.7 million tons o f fuel and lubricants expended
while building over 8,000 airfields. The Soviet Union also claimed more then

^ Butowski, Piotr and Miller, Jay OKB MiG: A History o f the Design Bureau and Its Aircraft pg
18

ibid

77,000 Luftwaffe destroyed, 44,000 to the guns o f the VVS. Costs were also
great, more then 80,000 VVS aircraft fell to Luftwaffe guns/^
The nuclear age brought about yet another re-organization of the VVS.
Stalin sought to develop an extensive air defense network and an indigenous
nuclear capability. In response to the threat posed by American intercontinental
bombers, Stalin created the Air Defense Command {Protivovozdushnaya oborona
or PVO) responsible for the defense of Soviet airspace. Stalin’s re-organization of
the VVS received a major windfall in 1947, the British government offered to sell
the Soviet Union twenty five Roll Royce Nene and thirty Rolls Royce Derwent
turbojet engines. This offer allowed the Soviets to hurdle past the problems
associated with domestic jet engine development. These engines were put to good
use, and soon aircraft capable o f intercepting the newest generation o f American
bombers were developed, the most significant was the M iG-15 (NATO codename
FAGOT).
North Korea burst across the border with South Korea on June 25^ 1950,
beginning the Korean War. The North Korean Air Force (NKAF) did very well
against the inferior South Koreans, but with the arrival o f the American Far
Eastern Air Force the NKAF was nearly annihilated. As the UN forces advanced
towards the Yalu River, China began to feel pressured from the south and asked
the Soviet Union for help to modernize her armed forces. Not wanting to become
directly involved in the war, Stalin gave China a large number of M iG-15’s to
augment its small air force. The M iG -15 was far superior to anything the UN had
in Korea at the time. By November however, the Americans began to introduce
" ibid

the F-86A Sabre to the Peninsula. The F-86 was more than a match for the
Chinese piloted MiG-15’s with the Americans achieving a kill ratio o f 15 to 1.
Soviet/Warsaw Pact pilots did take part in dogfights with the Americans. They
were far more proficient and deadly then their Chinese and North Korean
counterparts. The lessons learned by these pilots benefited future generations of
Soviet fighters.
After Stalin’s death in 1953, the VVS focus shifted towards strategic
nuclear warfare. Long-range TU-95 (NATO codename BEAR) and TU-16
j(NATO codename BADGER) bombers were developed and high speed
interceptor aircraft such as the MiG-21 (NATO codename FISHBED) were
introduced. The VVS also received control o f many newly developed IRBM and
ICBM missile systems. Invasion o f Soviet airspace by U-2 aircraft in the late
1950’s prompted a build-up o f surface to air missile sites throughout the country.
In the 1960’s with the development o f the XB-70 Valkyrie, the Soviet created
such aircraft as the Mach 3+ capable MiG-25 (NATO codename FOXBAT) to
intercept them.
Aid to friendly nations in the Middle East such as Egypt and Syria stepped
up in the early 1960’s. The Middle East and Vietnam became the laboratories for
Soviet aircraft and weapons designers. As American-made Israeli aircraft and
Soviet-made Arab aircraft dueled in the skies over the Sinai, the vast Soviet-built
air defense network o f North Vietnam tested American strike aircraft. The Middle
East was o f great interest to the VVS. Since the end of the Great Patriotic War,
the focus had been on defensive fighters and offensive missile and bomber forces.
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The Six Day War, however, taught the VVS the importance o f tactical aircraft,
capable o f supporting troops and striking defended targets close to the lines. This
led to the development o f aircraft such as the MiG-23/27 (NATO codename
FLOGGER), SU-24 (NATO codename FENCER) and SU-25 (NATO codename
FROGFOOT) as tactical support aircraft.
Focus began to shift from a global war to regional conflicts. The Soviet
Union became embroiled in the war in Afghanistan. The war against the
mujahedin was a new type of war for the Soviet Union. Much like the US in
Vietnam, the Soviet Union was unable to bring firepower to bear on an elusive
enemy. Consequently, the only large role the VVS took part was rotary winged.
The MI-24 (NATO codename HIND) and MI-8 (NATO codename HIP)
helicopters bore the brunt of the combat and transport roles in Afghanistan,
moving troops and attacking rebel positions. They suffered considerably. The
only fixed wing combat involvement of the VVS was with Su-25’s and ground
attack versions of the MiG-21 attacking mujahadien positions.

The VVS learned

much from its role in Afghanistan and its successor, the Russian Air Force is
applying these lessons in Chechnya.
In anticipation of the nuclear war with NATO, the Soviets deployed their
best units to Eastern Europe during the 1970’s and 1980’s. Frontal Aviation units
were on call twenty four hours day to repel an invasion of Warsaw Pact airspace
and strike tactical targets in Western Europe. In addition, Soviet nuclear armed

Combat did occur on a number occasions when Soviet/Afghan MiG-21 and -23 aircraft strayed
into Pakistani airspace and were engaged by the PAF. Long Range Aviation also did participate in
a few strategic bombing operations within Afghanistan from bases near Dushanbe. Source
ww w.acig.org

II

bombers were constantly on alert to strike targets in the continental US. The PVO
was to intercept incoming American bombers and fighters. This constant state o f
readiness was taxing on the VVS and by the late 1980’s, it could no longer
maintain this state of readiness. It was in this situation that the Soviet Union broke
apart and the VVS’s aircraft were divided up among the new republics, with
Russia and Ukraine getting the lion’s share o f hardware.
The future o f Russian air power is unknown. Gulf War I proved the fallacy
o f a Soviet air defense system. With little money and dwindling export markets
for its aircraft, the Russian Air Force has little room to re-equip and re-organize
itself. This is where MiG and all other design bureaus in Russia are today,
separated from the system they were founded and prospered under.
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C hapter II

Soviet Bureau System o f Aircraft Development

Soviet era design OKB bureaus {Opytno Konsrtuktorskoe byuro or
Experimental Design Bureaus) whether designing missiles or nuclear submarines,
operated in an environment foreign to Western designers. The first Soviet aviation
design bureaus were founded during the first Five Year Plan in 1928 by Andrei
Tupolev and Nikolai Polikarpov respectively. These design two firms, headed
both by TsAGI {TsentraVni aerogirdrodinamicheskii institut or Central Air and
Hydrodynamics Institute) graduates, formed the nucleus for tbp all large aircraft
design bureaus to come. After the pitiful performance of Polikarpov designs in
Spain against the German M e-109, the newly formed Commissariat o f Aviation
decided to take the best talent from each to form new firms. It was hoped this
action would bypass the stagnation these two firms were experiencing. The new
firms, headed by Aleksander Yakolev (Yak), Arytom Mikoyan and Mikhail
Gurevich (MiG), Syemyen Lavochkin (LaGG), Pavel Sukhoi (Sukhoi) and Sergei
Ilyushin (Ilyushin) created new advanced aircraft such as the MiG-1 and -3,
LaGG-3, Yak-3 and 11-2 Shturmovik. It was these aircraft that served as the
backbone o f the VVS throughout the Great Patriotic War.
The Second World War saw the beginning o f another trend in Soviet
aircraft design, reverse engineering. Aleksander Yakolev in his memoirs. Notes o f
an Aircraft Designer, admitted that “copying foreign models was a necessary
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Thanks to the Lend-Lease act the flood o f American and British aircraft
numbered more then 17,000^^ giving Soviet designers the chance to reverse
engineer many features, such as superchargers, engine control systems and lead
computing sights. Perhaps the most infamous case o f Soviet reverse engineering
was the Tupolev TU-4 (NATO codename BULL), a rivet by rivet copy o f the
American B-29 Superfortresses. The Soviet Union had “interned” many B-29’s in
Vladivostok after the Superfortresses had made emergency landings following
raids on Japan.

This reverse engineering feat gave the Soviet Union

intercontinental bombing capability well ahead o f a domestically designed
aircraft. Perhaps the most important gift to Soviet aircraft designers was windfall
of fifty Rolls-Royce jet engines from Britain in 1947. These reversed engineered
jet engines powered the first two generations o f Soviet jet powered fighter aircraft
and allowed the Soviets to hurdle past the problems o f developing an
indigenously designed jet engine program. This windfall is perhaps the most
important event in Soviet fighter aircraft design. Reverse engineering continued
until the early 1980’s when Soviet designers came up with aircraft such as the
SU-25 (NATO codename FROGFOOT), MiG-29 (NATO codename FULCRUM)
and SU-27 (NATO codename FLANKER). These aircraft, though highly
advanced and utizliting some notably Soviet designs, are still reliant on reverse
engineered Western designs.
Yakolev, Aleksander N otes on an Aircraft Designer pg 228
Butowski, Piotr and Miller, Jay OKB MiG: A History o f the Design Bureau and Its Aircraft pg
28
Other prominent examples o f reverse engineering include the AA -2 m issile (NATO codename
ATOLL), essentiality a copy o f a AJM-9B Sidewinder reverse engineered when a Chinese MiG
pilot was hit by a Sidewinder from a Taiwanese F-86. Luckily for the MiG pilot, the m issile failed
to explode and the m issile was recovered in good condition. For the sake o f brevity only the most
blatant examples have been discussed.
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Soviet design bureaus operated in an environment devoid o f financial
concerns. Feasibility was dictated by resource availability. In comparison to
Western design firms, there were no foreign or domestic costs associated with
marketing or production. In addition, there was one singular customer, the MoD
(Ministry o f Defense), responsible for all military hardware procurement o f the
armed services in the Soviet Union. Even commercial aircraft design was
managed through the MoD, as all Aeroflot aircraft were under the control of the
VVS in time o f war. With only one customer, however, creative designs did not
fare well and a clear evolution o f aircraft developed. This led to Soviet aircraft
design stagnation and a lack o f proactive research.
Designers in the Soviet Union were driven by what is called a
“requirement pull”, a design was created in order to counter an existing threat.
Western designers on the other hand were driven by a “technology push”, the uses
for the newest developed technology were researched extensively. A classic
example o f this divergence in motivation can be found in the development of
Look-Down-Shoot-Down-Radar^^ (LDSD) systems by each country. The US
developed this technology in the early 1960’s, well before the Soviets had aircraft
capable o f low altitude, high speed penetrations. The LSDS system was ordered
into production as the AWG-9 Phoenix system, even though no threat yet existed.
The Soviets chose not to implement LDSD systems until Western powers had
aircraft capable o f low altitude, high speed penetration in the mid 1970’s, even

L D SD systems can detect an aircraft at a low (sub 1,000ft) altitude, distinguish it fi-om
surrounding ground radar clutter and launch a m issile at it, all while the launch aircraft maintains a
higher altitude. It is particularly useful in engaging all weather, terrain follow ing aircraft such as
the F -1 1 1, B -IB , SU-24 or terrain masking helicopters.
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though the Soviet were capable o f deploying a system a decade earlier. Other
examples include the MiG-25 (designed to counter the XB-70 Valkyrie and later
the A -12 Oxcart and SR-71) and the MiG-27 (designed as a tactical fighter
bomber after lessons learned in Arab-Israeli and Vietnam Wars). It was not until
the late 1970’s and early 80’s that the Soviet design environment allowed for a
measure o f proactive research.

It is perhaps no coincidence that as Soviet

designers began to break away from the pattern o f reverse engineering and create
a generation o f Soviet fighters that included advanced indigenous technology, the
“technology push” was finally realized. Aside from why technology is
implemented in new design, the Soviets had a system not surprisingly, very
different from the west. A central committee known as MAP {Ministerstvo
aviatsionnoi promyshlennosti or Ministry fo r Aircraft Production) coordinated all
requirements originating from the MoD for aircraft development.
MAP was responsible for all aspects o f Soviet aircraft design under which
the Soviet design bureaus fall. It created manuals based on aspects such as
propulsion, airframe, avionics and fire-control. These manuals were given to the
respective bureaus as guidelines for design. This is why many Soviet aircraft
share such similarities such as air inlet design, undercarriage position and
cockpits.

Another aspect o f MAP is advanced flight research. In this capacity it

is roughly equivalent to NASA, but has a much more active role in input in new
designs then does its American counterpart. MAP takes the financial burden of
Examples o f this change to proactive design include the helmeted mounted IR sights on the
M iG -29, the phenomenal maneuverability o f the SU -27 due to thrust vectoring nozzles and a
break from GCI (Ground Control Intercept) dependence.
Butowski, Piotr and Miller, Jay OKB MiG: A Historv o f the Design Bureau and Its Aircraft pg
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flight testing and research off the bureaus, but in return limits their autonomy.
Under MAP there is an organization that has no equivalent in the Western world,
the TsKB (TsentraVnoe konstruktorskoe byuro or Central Construction Bureau).
The TsKB was the main conduit through which all requests for new
hardware flowed. When a request was made from the MoD, the TsKB made a
feasibility study to decide whether the project is worth pursuing with reference to
available resources, i.e. engines, avionics, airframe, raw material and labor. After
the feasibility study had been completed by TsKB, a check with both the customer
(MoD) and MAP occurred and the design was approved, the outline was then
given to the actual design bureaus. The role o f the TsKB in the world o f Soviet
aircraft design is essential. It injected the entire process with a sense of
competition. It created he incentive to make a better aircraft in a Soviet industrial
world dominated by quantity over quality. What is unique in the Soviet system is
that the TsKB headed a group of organizations that were in direct competition
with each other for resources and contracts.
Design bureaus not only design the aircraft, but after approval from the
TsKB built a small number of prototypes. These prototypes were, with the help of
MAP, tested rigorously before final approval from the MoD, TsKB and MAP.^^
The bureaus themselves did not, in the fashion o f western manufacturers, build
their own production aircraft. The workshop at M iG’s Zhukovsky testing facility
is typical o f most OKB’s in that space allowing the construction of only two
aircraft simultaneously. After the flight testing and finalization of plans for the
Please refer to appendix for a flow chart o f Soviet Military Aircraft Acquisition. Courtesy o f
General Dynamics via Butowski, Piotr and Miller, Jay OKB MiG: A Historv o f the Design Bureau
and Its Aircraft
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production aircraft, plans, tooling and expert technicians are sent to one o f the
many GAZ’s (Gosudarstewny aviatsionny zavod or State Aircraft Factory).
M iG’s assigned GAZ is, and continues to be, number 30^^ at Khodinkna in
Moscow. It employed over 30,000 people directly involved with aircraft
manufacture and 3,000 others manufacturing such items as kitchen appliances and
furniture. The factory covers 618 acres and contains 26,909,675 sq ft of floor
space!
Flight testing and delivery to either VVS or foreign forces occurred at
adjacent Lukhovsky airfield. Flight testing was done in three stages, the first
being plant flight testing, flown by factory pilots, the second, design testing,
flown by a combination o f military and factory pilots and finally state acceptance
testing, flown exclusively by military pilots. The aircraft OKB system of
awarding contracts and designs began to change again during the perestroika
period o f Gorbachev, but little information exists before the collapse o f the Soviet
Union. Today, OKB’s in Russia are struggling to cope with a new free market
economy. MiG has not sold an aircraft to the VVS in many years and this problem
will be discussed at the conclusion o f this work. The history o f the company is
somewhat akin to the story o f the Phoenix, as it rose to take flight from the ashes
o f the great OKB, Polikarpov, during the Second World War.

Interesting to note is that Lenin’s glass covered casket was built at the same factory after his
death in 1924.
Butowski, Piotr and Miller, Jay OKB MiG: A Historv o f the Design Bureau and Its Aircraft pg
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C hapter III

The Creation and History of MiG OKB

During the 1920’s and 30’s the design firm headed by Nikolai
Nikolayevich Polikarpov was the undisputed design champion o f Soviet fighter
planes. Having been arrested in 1929 and sent the gulags, Polikarpov was freed in
1933 to help modernize and expand the VVS. His firm designed the 1-15 biplane
and 1-16 monoplane, which would form the backbone o f the VVS until after the
opening stages o f the invasion o f the Soviet Union. The first combat test for these
aircraft came in 1936-37 during the Spanish Civil War. Achieving early
supremacy over the underpowered early M e-109's and Fiat CR.32’s, Polikarpov
was congratulated for his design. Unfortunately for the Soviets, the M e-109 was a
new aircraft and still engaged in teething problems. The Messerschmitt Company,
designers o f the M e-109, soon overcame these by equipping new 109’s with an
upgraded Daimler Benz engine and a 20mm spinner firing cannon,^^ Polikarpov
aircraft were very quickly unable to compete and were withdrawn from combat by
late 1937.
Eager to overcome the problems his aircraft had experienced over Spain,
Polikarpov designed and built a replacement, the 1-153. The 1-153, while
incorporating state o f the art technologies such as a retractable undercarriage, was
still a biplane and suffered accordingly. Notwithstanding thier excellent turn rate
and stability, biplanes are inherently slower then their monoplane counterparts.
This problem was obvious in combat with early Japanese Zeroes over Mongolia,
ibid pg 39
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The 1-153’s suffered greatly at the hands o f the superior Japanese aircraft,
infuriating Stalin.^^
After meeting with Stalin, Polikarpov began designing a high speed
monoplane to equip the VVS. He produced a prototype o f the 1-180 high speed
monoplane quickly and tests o f the new aircraft commenced. The testing was to
become the doom o f Polikarpov. The first test flight by Soviet national hero
Valeriy Chaklov, ended in disaster when the aircraft crashed and killed him.
Although the problem had nothing to do with the design (the aircraft was left
uncovered all night in -24C weather and the engine seized soon after takeoff),
Polikarpov took the loss hard. When the following two prototypes crashed due to
unrelated problems, Polikarpov became convinced o f his inferiority. As these
incidents took place during Stalin purges, allegations of sabotage naturally arose.
Many people in the firm and factory that produced the 1-180 were never heard
from again. It is a mystery how Polikarpov avoided implication, as many people
including the chief designer, Tomashyevich, were executed.^"^ The firm never
recovered from this disaster. Polikarpov was then sent to Germany as part of a
Soviet delegation to gather German aircraft technology. It was during his absence
that the team that would become MiG OKB was formed.
For some time the Polikarpov OKB had been working on a project simply
called “Project X” (Kh in Russian), a high speed, maneuverable well armed
monoplane somewhat along the lines o f the German M E-109. The NKAP
{Narodni kommisariat aviatsionnnoiipromyshlennost or Peoples Commissariat

Gimston, B ill and Gordon, Yefim MiG Aircraft Since 1937 pg 8
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fo r the Aircraft Industry) learned o f this project and decided to hasten it
completion, by forming an OKO (experimental design department) within the
Polikarpov OKB. On December 8, 1939 the new OKO was established, headed by
the bright young Arytom Mikoyan and his deputy Mikhail Gurevich, both
employees o f Polikarpov OKB. The Yakolev bureau had also been at work on a
similar project. Upon its completion in 1939 it was expected to go into
production. Yet the OKO headed by Mikoyan promised a higher top speed than
the Yakolev. After much wrangling with the NKAP, Stalin was convinced to wait
for the completion o f aircraft X. After all, Stalin was convinced speed in aircraft
was everything.
Anushavan (Arytom) Ivanoich Mikoyan was bom in the village o f Sanain
near the Turkish border with Armenia on August 5^ 1905. When war broke out
with Turkey in 1914, M ikoyan's family, along with most other Armenians in the
area, were convinced the Turks would invade and slaughter ethnic Armenians.
These fears lead to a mass movement o f Armenians away from the border.
Mikoyan would never return, instead settling with his family in Tbilisi in nearby
Georgia. His brother, Anastas became very involved with the Bolshevik party
during the war and in 1915 joined the party. He soon met and befriended a young
Joseph Dzhugashvili. This friendship would bear fruit for both Mikoyan’s
brothers later in life.^^

Arytom ’s brother by 1946 was the deputy premier o f the Soviet Union and the vice chairman o f
the Council o f Ministers. He retained this role through Khrushchev reign, even being awarded the
position o f Trade Minister. His position close to Stalin was perhaps the reason Arytom was not
implicated in the purges and his firm escaped Stalin’s rule with little damage. Anastas’s position
as trade minister in the 1950’s and 6 0 ’s undoubtedly helped M iG ’s foreign sales and allowed it
first choice o f imported resources.
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Arytom was accepted into a Tbilisi high school in 1918 and upon
completion o f school, joined the Communist party. He moved to Moscow to work
as a lathe operator in a factory, contracted tuberculosis and nearly died. Through a
miracle o f sorts, he was able to fight off the disease and make a recovery. While
working in the “dynamo” factories o f Moscow, Arytom became passionate about
Communist ideals and was called upon to serve a secretarial function for the
Party. Soon after he began the position, however, he was called to serve in the
Red Army. He served in the infantry until he received a commission at the Frunze
Academy. After his release from the Army, young Mikoyan was asked to enter
the VVA (Soviet Air Force Academy), where he studied at the Zhukovsky
Aeronautics Institute, pursuing a degree in aircraft design. During his time at the
Academy, Arytom became an accomplished parachutist, no small feat in the late
1930’s, and pilot. Part o f his studies at Zhukovsky required an internship at an
OKB and Arytom was sent to Kharkov and the design bureau o f D P Grigovich.^^
In Kharkov, Arytom, along with some friends, built an ultra light aircraft,
the Oktyabrenok (named for the organization of young children preparing to join
Young Pioneers) powered by a 25hp American engine and its flight
characteristics were wonderful. The instructors at the OKB looked very favorably
on Mikoyan for its low cost (under 12,000 rubles), and that it was foldable for
storage.^^ Soon after Artyom’s graduation, his aircraft flew a series of four testing
flights, each better then the last until, when on the fourth flight, the old engine
gave out and a forced landing was necessary. The damage was minimal, but it was
Butowski, Piotr and Miller, Jay OKB MiG: A History o f the Design Bureau and Its Aircraft pg
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the death blow to the students’ small program Arytom moved onto bigger and
brighter things. Arytom was assigned to Polikarpov fighter OKB in Moscow as a
VVS inspector.
Mikoyan rapidly advanced through the ranks of the OKB, gaining the trust
o f designers and engineers alike. Soon he was given his first independent project,
overcoming heat issues of the 1-153 with regard to gun firing. Within weeks
Artyom fixed the problem and became a protégé o f Polikarpov. It was from this
position he would emerge when his own OKO was formed in Polikarpovs
absence. It was also here that he met his future partner, deputy bureau chief
Mikhail Gurevich.
Mikhail Iosifovich Gurevich was born on January 12, 1893 near Kursk in
Ukraine.^^ The son o f a well-to-do distiller, Mikhail excelled at mathematics from
a young age. During his time at Kharkov University, young Gurevich became
involved in student movement o f which the czar disapproved and in 1911 Mikhail
was exiled to France. He continued his studies o f aeronautics at L 'Académie
r Aéronautique in Paris. After graduation and the October Revolution, Gurevich
returned to Kharkov University where he earned a post-graduate degree. In 1928
went to work for the TsKB. He was given a position working with Frenchman,
Paul Richard who was heading a project designing flying boats. The project was
completed and successful but was never ordered into production, Richard returned
home to France and Mikhail found work with the TsAGI.
In part because o f his command o f English Mikhail was asked to
accompany a delegation visiting the Douglas factories in the US in 1936. The
Gunston, Bill and Gordon, Yefim MiG Aircraft Since 1937 pg 10
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committee was to research and pursue a production license for the DC-3 in the
USSR, which they eventually accomplished. Upon return to the Soviet Union,
Gurevich was appointed Deputy Chief of the Polikarpov bureau, then to head a
new OKB with Mikoyan. The two men already had a blossoming friendship due
to their mutual ties to Kharkov University and they soon found they worked and
complimented each other very well. Mikoyan had stated that he would head the
company “provided Gurevich can be my deputy”.^^ Mikoyan became the energy
while Gurevich, thirteen years his senior, played the devils’ advocate. On
December 8, 1939 MiG was bom.
As MiG was a break off o f the Polikarpov bureau, employees were given
the option o f going with the new design team or staying with Polikarpov. Nearly
40% o f Polikarpovs employees went with MiG to refine Project X into a viable
fighter. Polikarpov, away in Germany during the break-up was understandably
distraught. On his death bed in 1944, said the events o f 1939 hastened his
downfall.^^
Refinement o f the 1-200 (former Project X) was quick. It was the first
fighter aircraft to exceed 400 mph in level flight, and though it had proved to be a
quirky aircraft to fly and master, it was rushed into production in early 1940 as the
MiG-1. The first examples were seen in the annual May Day Parade fly-over in
Red Square in 1940. The initial version was very quickly updated and renamed
the MiG-3. When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941, fully one

Ibid
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third o f VVS fighters were M iG’s, the only non-obsolete aircraft in the Soviet
inventory.
MiG received an order for the design o f a ground attack aircraft in 1941,
but the success o f the Ilyushin 11-2 in the early stages o f Operation Barbarossa
convinced Stalin to put all production capacity behind the 11-2 and the order was
cancelled.^* Throughout the war M iG’s performed decently, although not to their
fullest capabilities. The early M iG -l’s never reached full scale production and
frontline numbers were limited. On the other hand, over 3,000 MiG-3 were
accepted by the VVS.^^ The MiG-3 excelled at high altitude intercepts and once
this was discovered by the Germans^^, the Luftwaffe engaged the MiG’s at lower
altitudes where their aircraft held the advantage. Stalin believed aircraft were to
support ground troops and therefore was keen on the success o f the lL-2
Shturmovik. He halted production o f the MiG-3 in the beginning o f the 1942 to in
order to concentrate on Shturmovik production.
The rapid advance o f the Wehrmacht into Soviet territory spawned a mass
migration o f Soviet industry eastward. Soviet industry that had not yet succumbed
or was west of Urals moved east. Part o f this mass exodus o f man and machine
was MiG, starting east in August 1941. The move was incredible, set-up to
produce aircraft until the last possible second GAZ 1, was disassembled and
rushed eastward to get the lines rolling once again. An airfield, factory and very
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modest facilities were quickly built and by October, the factory was up and
running. As the Nazi push towards Moscow fizzled, the threat subsided and by
March o f 1942 MiG and GAZ-1 returned to Moscow. The OKB was reorganized,
the GAZ renumbered 155 and MiGs new home became Leningradskoye Shosse
(Leningrad Highway). MiG continued producing designs for new fighter aircraft
throughout the war, but for various reasons, never again won a piston engine
contract. MiG seemed destined for obscurity, especially in light o f the
conservatism o f the Stalinist era. Jet engine design and technology, however,
would prove the saving grace o f MiG.
In late 1944 Stalin issued an order for jet fighter aircraft just as the
German Me-262 was gaining notoriety. The Allies, in a program headed by Frank
Whittle, also announced they were flying jet aircraft, albeit not yet in combat.
This naturally infuriated the General Secretary aftd Soviet OKB’s were pushed to
catch up. Soviet jet design was nearly non-existent; the only semi-viable option
was a strange piston powered jet engine that was severely lacking. It was not until
the end o f the war and the capture of German BMW jet engines that design of
such aircraft became viable. Using information gathered fi-om German scientists
and designers, MiG created the MiG-9, the first Soviet jet powered fighter, in
August 1946. An interesting side note that through a flip of a coin, it was also the
first jet powered Soviet aircraft to take flight.^'^Though its performance was
average and its maintainability poor (the average life o f the engines was only 75
hours) it launched MiG to the forefront o f Soviet OKB’s. A gift far greater then
this was in store for MiG in the near future.
Gimston, Bill and Gordon, Yefim MiG Aircraft Since 1937 pg 10
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A short sighted gift from Great Britain allowed MiG to develop the MiG15. Great Britain sent the Soviets twenty five Rolls-Royce Nene jet engines and
thirty Derwent jet engines at their request.^^ This gift, coupled with captured
German data on swept wing design, allowed MiG to create this new aircraft. The
M iG-15 (NATO codename FAGOT) would soon gain infamy in the skies over
Korea, and secure MiGs place in the hierarchy o f the Soviet defense
establishment. MiG soon became the premier fighter OKB, quickly
overshadowing such famous names as Ilyushin, Lavochkin and Tupolev. For the
next forty years the VVS ordered almost exclusively MiG aircraft to equip its
fighter regiments.
Arytom Mikoyan reached the rank o f General Constructor of the MiG
design bureau on December 20, 1956. He continued in this capacity even after a
serious stroke, which in 1969, left his deputy Rostislav Belyakov, as head
constructor. He died on December 9, 1970. Gurevich outlived his partner but was
plagued by illness from 1957 onward, retiring in 1964 and passing away in 1976.
The company continued in their tradition o f excellence. Since 1960, more then
20,000 M iG’s have been produced (excluding license built copies), more then any
other modem aircraft manufacturer.^^ The company later helped design the Bur an
Space Shuttle in the 1980’s. In the early 1990’s MiG merged with MAPO
(Moscow Aircraft Production Organization) to become MiG-MAPO and today it
is simply know as RAC (Russian Air Company) MiG. Importantly RAC MiG was
granted the right o f independent foreign economic activity by President Boris
Butowski, Piotr and Miller, Jay OKB MiG: A History o f the Design Bureau and Its Aircraft pg
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Yelstin on January 25, 1996.^^ Today, the company faces financial hardships that
were never anticipated under the Soviet system. The future o f MiG is still
uncertain.

www.migavia.ni/eng/corporation/?tid=4
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C hapter IV

Synopsis o f MiG Aircraft Since 1950^*

MiG enjoyed moderate success during the Great Patriotic War, with the
MiG-1 and -3 and immediately afterwards with the MiG-9, yet it was the Cold
War era that would propel MiG into the everyday world lexicon. The M iG-15 was
the first aircraft from the Mikoyan Gurevich OKB to receive worldwide fame. It
was designed to complete an order from the MoD for a fighter capable of “up to
Mach .9 and altitude not less then 11km (36,089ft), with an endurance of at least
one hour, the ability to operate from unpaved airstrips, heavy big gun armament
and easy maintenance”^^. Work began on the M iG-15 in 1946. Wartime engines
captured from the Germans were not able to meet the thrust demand, but with the
acquisition o f Rolls-Royce jet engines from Great Britain work proceeded. A
reverse engineered version o f the Rolls-Royce Nene engine, the RD-45, was
chosen to power the MiG-15. A radical design for the day, the M iG-15
incorporated a swept wing design, a design learned from captured German
scientists and documents. The first flight o f the M iG-15 took place in m id-1948,
around same time as the first flight o f the American F-86 Sabre. It was ordered
into production soon after, with the first rolling o f the production line of GAZ 1 in
December. The VVS accepted the aircraft in early 1950 for fi-ont line service, just

For a flow chart and visual representation o f each aircraft see appendix
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as war on the Korean Peninsula erupted. Korea became the proving ground for the
first generation of swept wing jet fighters.
Stalin, unwilling to become directly involved in the Korean War, instead
^ave the Chinese a number of M iG -15’s to offset the air superiority of UN forces
over Korea."^® When the first MiGs appeared over the Yalu River in November of
1950, the UN forces had nothing to counter. A US Air Force F-80 Shooting Star
became the first victim o f an all jet dogfight, falling to the guns o f a Chinese MiG
on November 8."^^ The US was quick to respond with the deployment of advanced
F-86 Sabres to Korea. The first MiG to fall to the Sabres was shot down over the
Yalu in early December. By the end of the conflict, US Sabres had destroyed
nearly 800 MiG-15’s while losing only 78 F-86’s, ending with a kill ratio of 10 to
1. This did not mean the MiG was an inferior aircraft, it most certainly was not. It
enjoyed a better climb and dive rate and was considerably more robust than its
American counterpart, but the skill of the average MiG pilot was inferior to US
pilots. When flown by a competent pilot the M iG-15 was deadly as almost 80
American pilots discovered."^^
Though the M iG-15 did not dominate the skies over Korea, many
countries chose to equip their air forces with them. Poland, China and
Czechoslovakia all produced domestic, license-built versions. Overall nearly over
16,000 M iG-15 in numerous variants were built with some still serving as training

Soviet pilots were flying combat m issions over Korea albeit in Chinese marked M iG ’s. Please
see Chapter 6.
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aircraft today. Improvement on a design such as this is natural. From the lessons
learned in the MiG-15 the MiG-17 (NATO codename FRESCO) was designed.
In response to a call from the MoD for an all-weather, radar equipped
interceptor, MiG began design on the M iG-17. With Soviet jet engine design still
lagging behind the West MiG decided to improve upon the aerodynamics o f the 15. The wings were swept back further, reducing the thickness o f the wing and the
tail was re-engineered. The design was a success and entered production in 1953.
A later variant, the M iG-17F was equipped with a KV-1 afterburning engine
thereby increasing the Fresco’s speed and power drastically. Production numbers
eventually reached nearly 11,000 aircraft with license-built versions in nations
such as Czechoslovakia, Poland and China
The Fresco saw combat in places such as Vietnam, the Sinai Peninsula,
Africa and the Indian sub-continent and did well. During the Vietnam War,
American pilots, in far more advanced aircraft, found themselves at disadvantage
to the small, maneuverable M iG-17. This was especially true due the restrictions
placed on BVR (Beyond Visual Range) engagements for American pilots.
General Robin Olds, one o f the top American aces o f the war, said “Unlike the
chair-bome strategists in the Pentagon and their computer analysis, I can say that
the M iG -17 is a very dangerous little animal. Its maneuverability is phenomenal!
It is very difficult to outmaneuver it with an F-4 Phantom.”^ MiG-17s also served
in the Indo-Pakistani wars and the Arab-Israeli wars although they did not
perform as well as they had in Vietnam due to the nature o f the combat.

Gunston, B ill and Gordon, Yefim MiG Aircraft Since 1937 pg 82
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The Korean War was studied diligently by both the Soviet MoD and the
OKB’s. The MoD issued a call in 1953 for “a frontal fighter (i.e. not a radar
equipped interceptor) capable o f Mach 2 in level flight at an altitude of 20km
(65,617ft) while carrying guns and a radar-ranging s i g h t . L a t e r this requirement
included integration o f a GCI (Ground Control Intercept) network and the ability
to fire guided missiles. MiG came up with perhaps the most famous Soviet fighter
design ever, the MiG-21 (NATO codename FISHBED).
Incorporating such features as large delta wings, an afterburning engine
and the ability to fire K-13 (NATO codename ATOLL) infrared air-to-air
missiles, the MiG-2 IF was an advanced design. When it entered production in
late 1959, the MiG-2 IMF was one o f the most advanced aircraft in the world.
Used by more then 40 countries worldwide, it became one o f the most prolific jet
fighters in the world, numbering more then 14,000 aircraft, many still in service
today. In combat the M iG-21 was the victor and the vanquished many times over.
First seeing combat in Vietnam and the Middle East, its record was mixed. In
Vietnam the MiG-21 did fairly well, downing a number o f American aircraft,
including a B-52. The Arab-Israeli Wars were a different story, with Fishbeds
suffering greatly at the hands o f the more proficient Israeli pilots. The MiG-21
also served in the war on the Indian sub-continent, where it did quite well against
American F-104 Starfighters. This war also was the first in which MiG on MiG
combat occurred. A Pakistani F-6 (Chinese version o f the MiG-19"^^ (NATO

ibid pg 141
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codename FARMER)) destroyed an Indian MiG-21. MiG-2 T s also participated in
the Iran-Iraq War, and suffered greatly to the American supplied F-4 Phantoms,
F-5 Freedom Fighters and F-14 Tomcats."^^ The MiG-21 continues to serve to this
day having recently participated in the wars o f the break-up o f Yugoslavia. With
modifications done to the fire control and avionics by MiG and such companies as
lAI in Israel, the MiG-21 will continue to serve well into the 21^* century.
In the mid-1960s, the need for a fighter-bomber capable o f STOL (short
takeoff and landing) was realized by the VVS. The MoD issued a call for design
and MiG created the first production variable geometry aircraft in the Soviet
Union, the MiG-23/27"^^ (NATO codename FLOGGER). The MiG-23 was
designed at a time when the high speed performance o f aircraft was exceeding the
capabilities o f pilot and structure. Due to the small wing surface o f aircraft such
as the MiG-21 and F-104 Starfighter, landing speeds were becoming intolerably
high. In addition, the aircraft were not proficient in air-to-ground munitions. They
could not carry the load required and the speeds at which they operated precluded
successful engagement o f ground targets. MiGs designers, taking the lead of
American programs such as the F-111 and even captured German documents,
worked to solve this problem by using a “swing wing” design whereby the
aircrafts wing surface would extend for low speed-high maneuver operations, and
sweep to a near delta configuration for high speed-low maneuver situations. The

These aircraft were supplied to the Shah prior to the Islamic Revolution on 1979. Their story is
fascinating as the Iranians managed to maintain and keep them combat ready despite embargoes.
Am azingly some are still flying to this day.
The M iG -27 is a further incarnation o f the M iG-23. D esigned to be a tactical support aircraft, it
was optim ized for ground attack with slightly different intakes, advanced nav-attack system and
the ability to sweep the wings with stores on pylons.
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swing wing also lowered landing and takeoff speeds allowing the MiG-23/27 to
operate from shorter, unprepared landing strips. The first production MiG-23
rolled off the production line in mid 1969."^^ The MiG-23 was faster then the
MiG-21, could cany a heavier, more varied payload and could operate from
dispersed airfields. The VVS hoped the MiG-23 to be the answer to what was
needed; a reliable, fast maneuverable, versatile fighter-bomber.
The MiG-23 was a large success as hoped, it was a very complicated
aircraft to build and maintain. In addition, transition to the aircraft was not as
smooth other aircraft had been and a two-seat trainer version was hurriedly put
into production. The MiG-23 was also difficult to maintain. There were structural
integrity problems with aircraft produced at certain factories. The aircraft was
exported and license built by many countries with nearly 3,000 examples being
produced worldwide. Its combat record is also less then stellar. The Flogger saw
widespread service during the Iran-Iraq War with the Iraqi Air Force, but could
not operate very effectively over hostile territory and fell prey to the more
advanced Iranian Air Force. During the Israeli “Peace for Galilee” Operation it
also saw service with Syria, where it again suffered significantly to Israeli
aircraft.

The MiG-23 was phased out o f service with the VVS in the m id-1980’s

in favor o f the new MiG-29. It remains one o f the more disappointing aircraft
MiG produced. An air show at Domodedovo in July o f 1967 was the first showing
o f not only the MiG-23 but its stable mate, the MiG-25 (NATO codename
FOXBAT).
Belyakov, R.A and Marmain, J. MiG: Fifty Years o f Secret Designs pg 362
Butowski, Piotr and Miller, Jay OKB MiG: A History o f the Design Bureau and Its Aircraft pg

220

34

During the 1960’s the CIA and the USAF deployed the A -12 and the SR71 reconnaissance platforms, both capable o f Mach 3+. The US also developed a
high speed high altitude bomber capable o f Mach 3+. The XB-70 Valkyrie was to
penetrate Soviet airspace at high altitude and at high speed to deliver its nuclear
payload. In addition, the US Navy fielded the A-5 Vigilante; a carrier based
nuclear capable attack aircraft capable of speeds nearing Mach 2.5. The Soviets
saw the need to counter this threat and the call for a Mach 3+, high altitude
interceptor with a powerful radar was issued. The MiG-25 was bom out o f this
order. With testing beginning in the m id-I960’,s and the first public showing in
1967, production o f the first Foxbat commenced in 1970. The XB-70, one of the
aircraft the MiG-25 was designed to counter, never reached production, but SR-71
Blackbird reconnaissance aircraft were harassing Soviet Air Defenses in the Far
East on a regular basis. Many o f the new MiGs were sent to intercept them, a feat
they never accomplished. The high speed high altitude capability of the MiG-25
made it, ironically enough, the perfect reconnaissance aircraft. It was in this form
that the MiG-25 first found itself in a combat situation.
The Soviets deployed a number o f reconnaissance versions of the MiG-25
to Egypt in 1971 to over-fly and photograph the Sinai Peninsula and Israel itself.
These MiG-25’s, stationed in Cairo and flown by Soviet pilots, flew with
impunity over the Israeli air defense network. According to Israeli sources, the
MiGs were tracked flying at Mach 3.2 and altitudes approaching 72,000ft.^^ It
was not until 1981 that a MiG-25 was lost to hostile fire; in this case a Syrian

Butowski, Piotr and Miller, Jay OKB MiG: A History o f the Design Bureau and Its Aircraft pg
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MiG-25 was ambushed by two Israeli F-15 Eagles. The most notorious case of the
MiG-25 is that o f the defection of Lt. Viktor Belenko to Hokkaido Japan in 1976.
This answered many questions concerning the Mach 3 interceptor. Air to air
combat with the MiG-25 occurred during the Iran-Iraq War, with the MiG-25
scoring a number o f kills, although they suffered heavily to the Iranian F-14’s. Lt.
Belenko also warned that a new MiG-25 version, optimized for low altitude high
speed intercepts, was being developed to counter the threat posed by the
American B-IB. Satellite photographs during the early 1980’s confirmed the
existence o f this aircraft which came to be known as the MiG-31 (NATO
codename FOXHOUND).
Optimized for high speed, low altitude intercepts, the Foxhound used the
latest in Soviet LDSD (look down shoot down) radar systems, carried the new
AA-9 (NATO codename AMOS) long-range missile and was operated by a crew
o f two. The Foxhound was a near total redesign o f the MiG-25, with new
lightweight, efficient Solyukov engines replacing the thirsty Tumansky engines of
the Foxbat. The fuselage was lengthened to accommodate a WSO (weapons
system officer) and the airframe was strengthened for a higher g rating. This new
M iG-31 was photographed for the first time by a Royal Norwegian Air Force F16A off the coast o f Firmmark in 1985.^^ Still posing a threat today, it is in service
with the Russian and Chinese Air Force.
In 1972, the VVS issued an order for a lightweight fighter to replace the
MiG-21 and -23. It was to combat such as aircraft as the American F-15, -14, -16,
French Mirage 2000 and Panavia Tornado, all coming online in the West. It was
Butowski pg 110
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to operate over friendly territory as an interceptor under the close supervision of
GCI controllers; in addition it was to have limited air-to-ground capabilities using
precision guided munitions. Out o f the VVS order came the MiG-29 (NATO
codename FULCRUM). The MiG-29 is a single seat, twin engine design bearing
resemblance to the American F-15, though it is not a copy o f it. The first
production MiG-29 rolled off the assembly line in 1982, at a plant in Moscow.
Initially deployed to the 16* Air Army in East Germany, all production aircraft
were earmarked for the VVS. In 1986, the first export versions, with downgraded
avionics and radars, were delivered to India. Sales followed shortly to Warsaw
Pact countries and Middle Eastern nations. More then 1500 have been built to
date, with MiG still producing Fulcrums for the Indian Navy.^^ It is also the only
Russian-built aircraft to serve in a NATO air force.
Prior to the fall o f the Soviet Union, the MiG-29 demonstrated its
phenomenal maneuverability during airshows in the West, performing tail slides
and other previously unheard of maneuvers. Today the MiG-29 is employed the
world over, with more than 21 nations.^"^ However, the MiG-29 has not been
promising in combat. In G ulf War I the only aircraft it shot down was another
Iraqi fighter, just prior to it own crash into the ground. In addition, four more
M iG-29's were downed by American F-15’s during the conflict. Losses also
occurred during the Eritrean-Ethiopian War in which more then five Fulcrums
were shot down by Ethiopian SU-27’s (NATO codename F L A N K E R ).T w o
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MiG-29’s of the Yugoslavian Air Force were downed during the NATO bombing
campaign by American F-15’s. In 2001 two Syrian MiG-29’s were downed by
Israeli F-15’s.^^ Very few victories exist for the MiG-29 in combat/^ The aircraft,
however is selling, with Malaysia being the latest customer. This aircraft is related
directly to the future o f MiG as a company, as the call for new designs by the
MoD looks dim. How MiG reacts to the present and future will decide its fate.

ibid
A Cuban M iG -29 did succeed in downing a civilian Cessna 337 in 1996. www.acig.org
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Part II
Case Studies of Four Generations o f MiG Aircraft in Combat
Introduction
Fighter aircraft development in the post war era can be divided into
several distinct generations. The development of post-Second World War jetpropelled straight winged aircraft such as the German Me-262, the American P/F80 Shooting Star, the British Gloster Meteor and the Soviet MiG-9 constituted the
first jet-turbine driven fighter aircraft. These aircraft were not much faster than
their propeller-driven counterparts and were less maneuverable. Additionally,
they were considerably more expensive to build and maintain then the fighter of
World War Two. Although an improvement over previous prop-driven aircraft, jet
turbine-driven aircraft left much to be desired as viable weapons platforms.
Hence, they are usually not included as a separate generation.
The first generation designated by aviation experts included the first
aircraft to make use of captured German technologies such as swept wing
d e s ig n .T h e y were also the first generation able to break the sound barrier, albeit
only in a dive. Aircraft in this generation include the American F-86 Sabre, the
Soviet M iG-15 and the British Hawker Hunter. These aircraft, along with some
first generation jets, participated in many conflicts such as Korea, the Suez crisis,
the Indo Pakistani wars and the Six Day War, and numerous other skirmishes.

Aviation W eeks Show N ew s Online September 10, 1998 “On the record with Maj Gen Steffan
Nastrom C hief o f Swedish Air Force Material Command”
http://www.aviationweek.com /shownews/today/newsm kl4.htm
D efining first generation aircraft in manner consistent with international aviation experts dismisses
aircraft that were developed during the Second World War. Only aircraft developed post-War are
included such as the M iG -15 and F-86.
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Some o f these aircraft are still in service today as training aircraft, ground attack
aircraft or in reserve roles in many o f today’s third world nations.
Second generation aircraft were the first to be able to fly at supersonic
speeds in level flight. The American F-lOO Super Sabre was the first of these.
Improvements in avionics, engine and weapons design, along with a shift in
policy towards bomber interception created missile-carrying aircraft capable of
engaging and destroying intruding enemy bombers. Aircraft in this generation
include the American F-4 Phantom and F-105 Thunderchief, the Soviet M iG-19
and M iG-21 and the British Lightning. These aircraft are still in service with
many air forces around the world, including NATO and former Warsaw pact
nations. The proving grounds for these second generation aircraft include,
Vietnam the Arab-Israeli wars and the Iran-Iraq war. These aircraft are still being
refitted and improved upon.
The third generation includes most modem front line fighters. These
include the American F-15 and -16, the Soviet/Russian MiG-23 and -29 and SU27, the European^^ Tornado and the French Mirage. These aircraft are currently in
the middle o f thier service life and most likely will continue to fly well into the
21®* century. The third generation is typified by fly-by-wire systems^^, advanced
radar and fire control systems and increased maneuverability. Equipped with
much more efficient engines, these aircraft are allowed more flight time at higher

The Tornado was built and designed by and international consortium from Britain, Germany
and Italy.
Fly-by-wire is a system in which pilot input is not direct linked with control surfaces, instead the
control surfaces are controlled via a computer system. This allows highly unstable aircraft designs
to be controllable as the computer makes thousands o f corrections to the flight surfaces a second.
It also allows the computer to evaluate the pilots input and then decide how best to perform the
maneuver, thus allowing unparalleled maneuverability.
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speeds. Most have also adopted multi-role positions, optimized for air-to-ground
and air-to-air engagements, often within the same sortie. These aircraft have seen
conflict in the Middle East during the 1982 Israeli invasion o f Lebanon, both Gulf
Wars, the skies o f Bosnia/Kosovo and in many other small skirmishes during the
last twenty years around the world.
The fourth generation o f aircraft takes the multi-role aspect even further.
Among their advantages are digital avionics and fire control, supersonic cruise
and incredible maneuverability. Militaries around the world hope the flexibility
offered by these new aircraft engender a one type air force, thus simplifying
training, maintenance and supply problems. The cockpits o f these aircraft will
also replace all but the most essential gauges with M FD 's^\ Although flight
testing o f fourth generation aircraft is at a very advanced stage, the only nation
that has fielded such an aircraft in front line service is Sweden, with the SAAB
Gripen. Expected to enter service in late 2005 the United States is developing the
F-22 Raptor, while the Eurofighter Typhoon is expected to enter service with the
countries o f Germany, Italy, Britain and Spain soon. Russia has lagged behind in
this field, although some argue that the SU-27 Flanker and the aircraft evolving
from it are truly the first fourth generation aircraft. However, the initial SU-27
lacked the sophistication o f aircraft such as the Raptor, Typhoon or Gripen. Due

M FD ’s or Multi-function displays are display screens much like a computer, that with a touch o f
a button, can control and monitor any number o f systems within the aircraft such as navigation,
fire control, engine management or communications. These monitors both save space and provide
the pilot with much more information at a glance then previous gauged type cockpits. Some later
third generation aircraft have M FD ’s but the fourth generation is the first to have them included at
the initial design level.
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to fiscal constraints MiG in particular has stalled the development of its fourth
generation aircraft, the MiG 1.44.
This is the first generation o f aircraft in which MiG has not been at the
forefront o f aircraft development. Its designs have played a major role in nearly
every air-to-air engagement o f the post-war era, beginning with Korea and
continuing to this day in places such as the Middle East, the Balkans and Asia. A
short history and evaluation o f MiG aircraft within each generation from Korea to
present day, including lessons learned from previous conflicts, is the key to
understanding the design bureau and its designs.
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C hapter V

The Korean War
The MiG-15 and the First Generation of Soviet Jet-Powered Fighters

When North Korea careened across the 38^*’ parallel on June 25* 1950,
there was little in the way o f airpower to stop them. South Korea possessed no
armed aircraft and very few transports. Most o f these were caught by surprise and
destroyed on the ground in the early hours o f the invasion. At the outbreak of
hostilities the North Koreans had mostly surplus World War Two Soviet aircraft
such as Yak-9's and Il-lO’s. Although obsolete, they were extremely effective as
they were no counter threats. The North Korean Air Force reigned supreme over
the skies o f Korea for a short time, until the US Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF)
began to launch sortie against them fi-om both Japan and the Korean Peninsula.
FEAF wrested control o f the air from the North Korean Air Force (NKAF)
Very quickly. American F-82 Twin Mustangs and early jet aircraft such as the F80 Shooting Star, decimated the poorly trained and equipped NKAF. By the time
o f the Inchon landing in September of 1950, the NKAF has nearly ceased to exist.
The UN now dominated the skies and pounded relentlessly the beleaguered North
Korean soldiers trapped between Seoul and Pusan. A rapid retreat ensued and by
October UN forces had crossed the 38* parallel into North Korea. Air operations
during this time were in tactical direct support of ground forces, strafing and
bombing enemy locations, and strategic bombing of North Korea by B-29’s
operated fi-om Japan. Little air opposition was met by either. The B-29 raids
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became known as “milk runs” by the aircrews as not even enemy
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anti-air artillery was encountered. Without outside help the NKAF was in no
position to defend its airspace from the UN forces. Mistakes made by American
pilots and planners, however may have served to reinforce plans in Beijing and
Moscow to intervene in the war.
On September 22, a flight o f US B-29 Superfortresses accidentally
bombed the rail marshalling yard at Antung, north o f the Yalu River and inside of
China. After making a navigational error on October 8, four US F-80 Shooting
Stars attacked a Soviet airfield near Vladivostok.^^ Some speculate these errors
may have convinced China and the USSR that UN forces had intentions extending
outside the boundaries o f North Korea. These two actions may have been the
catalyst for the Soviets to deploy MiG-15’s (NATO codename FAGOT) and
pilots to China to counter the dominate UN air forces. The USSR also began
training Chinese and North Korean pilots to fly the MiG-15.
On November 1 1950, six previously unidentified swept wing jet fighters
made a firing pass on a flight o f US F-51 Mustangs.^"^ The swept wing fighters
came in from north o f the Yalu and fled back across after the unsuccessful attack.
The US fighters were unable to pursue as anything north o f the Yalu was, and
would continue to be throughout the war, off-limits. Even when the commander
o f the 25^ FS/51®^ FW, Lieutenant Colonel Clure Smith, flying an F-80C, brought
back gun camera footage clearly showing a M iG-15 he had engaged, the
intelligence and command communities did little to counter the threat. However,

Knez, Saso and Joe Brenan. “Honchos” Air Combat Information Group Journal. October 2003
http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article 315 .shtml
^ Dorr, Robert, Lake, Jon and Thompson, Warren Korean War Aces (Osprey. London, 1995)
Pg 15
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on November 8 the first jet-vs-jet aerial victory occurred. Lieutenant Russell
Brown was credited with downing a M iG -15, though the Soviets disputed this fact
and claimed an F-80 was d o w n e d .T h e first MiG kill confirmed by the Soviets
occurred the next day when Lieutenant Commander William Amen of VF-111
scored one o f the few Navy kills in his F9F Panther. Very quickly, the MiG-15
proved its worth over the skies o f Korea, proving far superior to anything in the
UN inventory. Able to out-turn and out-climb all jet fighters in the theatre, the
M iG-15 was faster then all prop driven aircraft and could attack with near
impunity the now vulnerable B-29 Superfortresses. It soon began to wrestle
control back from the UN forces.

M iG-15 Development: The Soviet Union Enters the Jet Age

Soviet designers in the immediate post-war era faced a huge dilemma.
Stalin had ordered the development of an aircraft that drastically exceeded the
performance o f early straight-winged MiG-9. The design called for the aircraft to
be effectively airborne for over an hour, able to operate at high transonic speeds

Dorr pg 16 This kill is highly debated, as the Soviets (the only nation with M iG -15s flying in
Korea at the time) does not acknowledge losing any aircraft that day. In fact the kill ratio
traditionally accepted by UN sources is n o w , with access to Soviet archives, highly suspicious.
Both sides claim far more kills then the other admits to losing. For example the US claim o f a 15:1
kill ratio is not corroborated by Soviet, Korean and Chinese sources. Soviets claim nearly a 1:1
ratio. Causes o f this are multiple but include the problem that the airspace where M iG-UN
engagements occurred over Communist controlled territory; therefore wreckage o f claims could
not be found. A lso many engagements ended with a MiG spinning and apparently out o f control,
yet out o f sight the aircraft recovered and returned to its bases north o f the Yalu. The issue o f kill
ratios will unlikely ever be resolved and for the purpose o f this work not be used as a measure o f
aircraft success.
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and able to achieve altitudes o f over 40,000 feet.^^ This criterion presented
difficult problems for Soviet designers. First, domestic jet engine development
was no where near the level needed for the speeds required. Soviet designs had a
very poor service record most engines needed full rebuilds after only 25 hours of
operation.

Another hurdle was the fact that at speeds over 500mph, straight

winged aircraft experienced stability problems, due to fluctuations in airflow over
control surfaces. The result o f exceeding this speed (called critical Mach number)
would often result in uncontrollable fluttering o f the tail and wings, often
separating these from the aircraft. Swept wing aircraft could raise the critical
Mach number to a much higher level, but Soviet designers possessed little
knowledge o f this design. Extensive research had been done by the German
Luftwaffe during the Second World War, but the nature of advancing Soviet
troops convinced nearly all research engineers and pilots to flee westward towards
US and British lines to surrender. Thus, the Soviet Air force did gather a wealth
o f data and material such as airfi-ames and importantly Jumo engines as they
advanced, but they did not capture many Luftwaffe test pilots or researchers. The
US had an edge after the war, with its vast knowledge o f Luftwaffe experiments
both through captured pilots and aircraft designers. As Luftwaffe Lieutenant
General A dolf Galland told his US intelligence officer during his debriefing, "I
am o f the opinion that Germany has lost the war but the future of eill Europe lies

^ Butowski pg 59
Saso Knez , D iego Fernando Zampini & Joe L. Brenan, Korea, 1 9 5 0 -1 9 5 3: Honchos.
http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_315.shtml:
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in the hands o f the allies (i.e. US and Britain). I have no place to go and no desire
to go anywhere. I will be at your wishes at all times.”^^
The Soviets captured few pilots and engineers. Unfortunately for the VVS,
the few who were captured were tried for bogus war crimes such as killing
civilians with stray machine gun rounds. Once sentenced to hard labor in Siberia,
these pilots and engineers were o f little use to the VVS. This would later harm the
tactical evolution o f the VVS as the Americans learned much from their captured
Luftwaffe personnel concerning new tactics being perfected towards the end of
the war. The VVS did benefit from captured Luftwaffe documents. It began to
incorporate these designs, along with captured German engines into its first post
war jet aircraft.
After experimentation with the swept wing designs, the MiG OKB used
both indigenous and captured Luftwaffe documentation, to develop an airframe
capable o f exceeding the performance o f the MiG-9 FARGO. Two areas of
airframe design allowed MiG to advance past the MiG-9. First, engine placement
was changed from the nose o f the aircraft (called the Redan design) to the rear of
the aircraft. This allowed more room in the forward fuselage, allowed placement
of the wings further forward and put the exhaust o f the jet engine at the complete
rear o f the aircraft, improving aerodynamics. O f equal importance was the
creation o f the swept wing. This wing design, now swept at an angle back from

Knez, http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_315.shtml
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the fuselage, allowed both a higher speed and better economy and stability.
These two designs formed the basis o f the M iG-15 (NATO codename FAGOT).
Airframe now ready, the Soviets still lacked a sufficient engine to propel
the new fighter to speeds o f which it was aerodynamically capable. This problem
was overcome in a most unusual manner. In fall o f 1946, Arytom Mikoyan and
his deputy ,Mikhail Gurevich, were invited by the British government to visit the
Rolls-Royce jet engine plant as part o f a trade agreement. This seemed too good
to be true at the time; the British possessed the world’s finest turbojet engines.
During the visit, Mikoyan acquired twenty five complete Rolls-Royce Nene
engines as well as rights to manufacture, over a game o f snooker.

One o f the

greatest windfalls for Soviet aviation was won by pool hall skill. Additionally,
during the visit one o f the Soviet delegates wearing very soft soled boots, stamped
around the milling machines that made the turbine blades and was able to secure
small pieces to analyze in Moscow. This helped the Soviets overcome a major
hurdle in jet engine production, mainly what materials would allow a turbine
blade to be able to withstand the extreme pressures and force encountered within
a turbine. Having discovered this composition, the Soviets manufactured the alloy
prior to the arrival o f the British engines at the Klimov design bureau. Coupled
with its new airframe, the newly designated RD-45 engine allowed performance
pleasantly beyond Stalin’s expectations.
Flight testing o f the 1-310, (as the prototype M iG-15 was called)
commenced at the end of December, 1947. The was quite a the surprise to MiG
Gordon, Yefim , and Vladimir Rigmant. M iG -15: Design. Development, and Korean War
Combat History. (Motorbooks International. Osceola, W l. 1993). pg 8
™ Gordon pg 23
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and the TsKB. Test pilot Yuganov was selected to carry out the first flight, to take
place in early January o f 1949. At the time, Soviet test pilots were given ten
thousand rubles as a bonus for first flights. Being short on money, Yuganov
decided the first flight must take place before the New Year. Though his requests
were denied, Yuganov took off during a high speed taxi trial on December 30^*^’
retracted the landing gear and flew two circles around the airfield. Thus the first
flight o f a MiG-15 was unauthorized.^^
At the same time that the M iG-15 was being designed and tested a similar
fighter, the L a-15 was being tested by rival OKB, Lavockhin. Despite its
acceptance into service for the VVS by Marshal Veshinin, the M iG-15 was
ordered to fly against the La-15 in a series o f tests to determine which design was
superior. Pilots decided upon the M iG-15 for a number o f reasons. It boasted ease
of maintenance, simpler manufacture, superior handling and take-off behavior,
better armament, greater range, superior rate o f climb and last but not least, better
reliability.^^ Despite these the La-15 possessed a higher top speed and more
stability at the transonic speed envelope. No clear Avinner was decided and both
designs were ordered into p ro d u ctio n .E x actly one year after Yungaov’s first
unauthorized flight, he flew the first production MiG-15.
As with any new aircraft, the M iG-15 was not without problems. Foremost
it had an unsettling habit of becoming unrecoverable during a spin. This
phenomenon was never rectified, instead pilots were instructed to avoid spins at

Gordon pg 17
Butowski pg 62
The L a-15 was a failure within the VVS with only 500 being made. It was withdrawn from
service in the early 1950’s in favor o f the M iG-15.
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all costs and an automatic airbrake at Mach .88 was incorporated. A weakness in
the materials used to make the tail was also discovered. During high speed dive
recoveries and combat maneuvers a small percent would deform leading to
occasional separation, better quality materials being retrofitted to all MiG-15’s
fixed this problem. Most importantly was the continuing redesign of the RD-45
powerplant.

Sketch o f M iG-15 74

The RD-45 did not live up to the expectations of the VVS, though based
on a good design, the Rolls-Royce Nene. It gulped fuel at an excessive rate, had a
poorer than expected thrust output and a higher than expected maintenance
schedule. Klimov, the manufacturer o f the RD-45, designed a new engine, the
VK-1. This produced twenty percent more power, had significantly lower fuel
consumption and required less time between engine overhauls. These
improvements were incorporated into the MiG-15bis, an upgraded version of the

http://www.fiddlersgreen.net/AC/aircraft/MIG-l 5/m igl 5_m fo/niigl 5_info.htm
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original. The MiG-15bis version would see the most use over the cold skies of the
Korean peninsula.

Duels at LOOP MPH: The Jet Comes o f Age
Korea

The air war in Korea began as the Second World War ended, with propdriven surplus aircraft used by both sides. In three short years the conflict ushered
in an era o f aerial combat shaped aerial warfare for the next twenty years. The
M iG-15 raised alarm bells inside Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF) command when it
was reported. The aircraft was vastly superior to anything fielded by the UN
forces in Korea at the time. More importantly the M iG-15 could disrupt with
impunity, the B-29 Superfortress bomber streams attacking tactical and strategic
targets within North Korea. The balance in the air began to swing towards the
Communist side for the first time in the war.
When the first MiG-15’s were sighted by American F-51 Mustang pilots
in November 1950, there was no North Korean or Chinese air force to speak of.
China had relied upon Soviet pilots and aircraft for air defense since the signing
o f the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty in February of 1950.^^ Soviet M iG-15 pilots
claimed kills against Kuomintang aircraft in April o f that year and may have been
in Shanghai for quite some time p re v io u s .T h e Soviet Unions involvement in the

Zhang, Xiamong. “China and the Air War in Korea, 1950-1953” The Journal o f Military History
Vol 62, N o.2 (April, 1998) pg 344
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Korean War, though widely speculated during the war, has become public
knowledge since the fall of the Soviet Communism and the opening o f Soviet
archives. It was Soviet pilots that gave the American and UN forces the greatest
challenge earning them the respectful name “Honcho’s”, by allied pilots. This is
not to say that North Korean and Chinese pilots were not skilled, but the vast
majority were ill prepared for the high speed aerial fighting that occurred over the
Yalu River. Yevgeni Pepelyeav, a former Soviet M iG-15 pilot is quoted, “If it
was a hard fight for the us, then what about the Chinese? Our Chinese allies were
inadequately trained for combat and suffered heavy losses. They were actually
aerial targets for the A m e r ic a n s .T h e Chinese and North Korean pilots also
suffered heavily due to the lack o f an anti-g suit^* coupled with a poor diet and
health. Many simply passed out during high G maneuvers or avoided them all
together. Indeed, it was the Soviet pilots who flew the M iG-15 to its greatest
potential.
Although it was flying fighter aircraft in Korea, the Soviet Union was
unwilling to publicly admit its involvement, Stalin was concerned that it could
lead to a broadening o f the war and could very quickly introduce nuclear weapons
to the conflict. Due to Stalin’s reluctance to further Soviet involvement
restrictions were imposed on Soviet pilots. All pilots were ostensibly volunteers,
though in truth entire units were rotated through. Pilots wore Chinese umforms
and were instructed to only speak Chinese over the radio despite the fact they

Gordon pg 137
An Anti-G suit is worn over the top o f a pilots flight suit. Using a system o f pressurized air, it
inflates and deflates to keep blood from rushing to or from the brain and causing loss o f
consciousness.
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knew were not fluent. Not surprisingly, Russian pilots speaking Chinese lasted
only until first contact. Soviet pilots were tasked with the protection o f the Yalu
River Valley from bomber raids. Their primary mission was interception of B29’s, not tangling with American fighter aircraft. As the Americans were eager to
get a hold o f a MiG-15 to study, all MiG pilots were forbidden to fly over the sea
for fear of being shot down and the aircraft recovered. Soviet pilots were
restricted to flying over friendly territory. The capture o f a Soviet pilot by the UN
would have been a publicity coup. Thus, most operations were limited to the area
known as MiG Alley, the target of most B-29 raids. Soviet pilots were not to
engage in offensive operations in the theater, thus Soviet MiG-15’s did not carry
bombs, napalm or rockets with which to attack UN ground fo rc e s .S ta lin hoped
that by keeping his posture defensive, a broader war could be avoided.

Early Soviet M iG-15 in Korea*^

Responding to the threat posed by the M iG-15, the USAF introduced the
F-86A Sabre to the Peninsula. On December 17^, 1950 the first patrol by Sabres

Gordon pg 139
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was flown over MiG Alley. Soviet pilots (thought to be Chinese) intercepted the
flight and in the ensuing battle Lt Col. Bruce Hinton became the first F-86 pilot to
down a MiG.

The duels for the next three years that ensued between the Sabres

and M iG’s over the Yalu River would become legend, in part due to the similar
design nature o f the aircraft involved.
The F-86 was a very similar aircraft to the MiG-15; in fact both were
based upon captured Luftwaffe research. The wing design on the F-86 had come
directly from captured Me-262’s. Both aircraft were similar sized and performed
comparably, however there were design elements that affected the manner in
which both types o f aircraft were flown in combat.
The M iG -15, with the RD-45 engine, could operate at altitudes up to
50,000ft. This was nearly 10,000ft higher than the original F-86A. It also climbed
much faster, had a better thrust to weight ratio and was more maneuverable at
higher attitudes then the Sabre. The Sabre gained speed in a dive faster than the
M iG-15 and was more maneuverable at lower both lower altitudes and higher
speeds. Importantly the armament also differed. The M iG-15 featured two NR-23
23mm cannons and a single N-37 37mm cannon, while the F-86 had six rapidly
firing .50 caliber machine guns. Both set o f guns presented problems for the
respective pilots. The M iG’s cannons, designed to destroy bombers, were very
lethal but fired slowly making deflection shooting difficult. The weight of the
round also made long range shooting more o f an art then a skill, as the drop
incurred on these massive rounds was immense. Despite these problems, if a
M iG -15 pilot scored hits on an F-86, the aircraft would most likely be destroyed.
Dorrpg 18
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The six Browning .50 caliber machine guns fitted on the Sabre were
accurate to a much greater range, but suffered because of their small size. During
the first engagement o f M iG’s and Sabres, Lt Col Bruce Hinton fired more then
1802 rounds at the MiG before it was killed. As Evgeny Pepalyeav states, “The
American .50cal guns acted like peas on our M iG-15’s. Our aircraft would return
to the airfields with 40 to 50 bullet holes. The Americans would claim them as
killed, while pilots landed them safe and sound. The M iG-15 was more survivable
then the Sabre; our pilot was protected from astern and the VK-1 and RD-45
engine itself was more survivable then the J47 found on the Sabre”^^ The F-86
also had a much better radar-ranging, lead-computing sight than the M iG-15, and
according to MiG pilots, theirs was not even used in the computing mode. 83

North American
F-8BE Sabre

84

Three Dimensional sketch o f F-86E
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Later versions o f the Sabre, the -E and -F models, had an improved
engine that decreased the MiG advantage o f ceiling and rate o f climb, but the
upgraded MiG-15bis suffered the same problems as the M iG-15 during dives and
at lower altitudes. Later models o f the Sabre had a different wing design and
powered flight controls, both increasing maneuverability while decreasing pilot
fatigue.^^ Interestingly, neither side addressed shortcomings dealing with
armament during the war.

Soviet Tactics. Successes and Problems

Tactics have traditionally evolved out o f ones strength while exploiting the
enemy’s weaknesses. Soviet pilots in Korea displayed this and used the
advantages o f their MiG-15’s to their greatest potential. The MiG-15, especially
against the earlier F-86 Sabres, held a distinct advantage in both rate o f climb and
operational ceiling. The F-86 could dive faster and was more maneuverable then
the MiG at lower altitudes. Thus, as Major General Sergey Kramarenko,
commander o f the 176* FAR, commented, ‘‘The F-86 and the M iG-15 rarely went
into protracted fighting. The fight, as a rule, was decided in the first attack. It did
not matter whether it was successful, after the first attack, MiG-15’s reached for
altitude, while Sabres raced for the ground. Each tried to get to the altitude where
it held the distinct advantage and thus the air battle, scarcely having begun, faded
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at once.”^^ The battle often turned into a game of baiting, each side trying to lure
the other to the altitude that offered the greatest chance o f downing the enemy.
Soviet tactics reflected this doctrine. MiG’s usually operated in a six
aircraft flight, loitering near the target they were to protect. There were usually
three flights o f six aircraft called, respectively, “attack, cover and reserve”.*’ The
attack flight’s main goal was disrupting o f the bombers or fighter bombers from
hitting the target; they left the escorting fighter aircraft to be dealt with by the
cover flight.** The reserve flight was to assist either flight if the need arose and
was not to engage unless needed.
During the entire course of a sortie, M iG’s were controlled by GCI
(Ground Control Intercept) officers who manned radar stations inside o f China.
MiG’s usually remained on the ground until GCI stations detected an incoming
threat; they then scrambled the M iG’s into the air and vectored them into the
target area. The system varied little from the proven system developed by the
Soviets during the Great Patriotic War.
After being vectored into position by the GCI, Soviet pilots would initiate
a head-on approach to the target, usually as high above the target as possible.
When the MiG flight was in proper range, they would divide up into three pairs
and dive on the target. The first pair would attempt to break up and scatter the
bombers, while the subsequent two pair would attack the most vulnerable targets
after they fled. As soon they finished attacking a target, the MiG’s would use their
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superior climb rate to zoom back to a perch greater than the escorting fighter
could reach. Then the original tactic was repeated. This tactic made it very hard
for the escorting Sabres to engage the M iG’s. They did not posses the thrust to
reach the altitudes from which the M iG’s began and by the time the MiG’s came
screaming toward the bombers, they were going much faster then the Sabres.
Another variation o f this tactic was called “hump the sun”. In this
variation, MiG pilots would dive out o f the sun towards a target, perform a half
roll whilst attacking and egress back upwards towards the sun. This tactic allowed
the MiG not only to escape to a higher altitude but also to escape visual detection
at the beginning and end of its dive.
Using these tactics, Soviet pilots fought very well against their UN
counterparts. They scored a claimed 1,300 aircraft downed while losing 345 MiG15’s.*^ Though these numbers do not match claims made by the Americans, they
nonetheless show that Soviet pilots were skilled. Nevertheless, Soviet pilots had
their fair share o f problems.
Soviet squadrons were rotated through Korea as a whole unit. In contrast,
the Americans rotated pilots through individually. This enabled new American
pilots to learn about combat firsthand from pilots who had been in-country for
some time. This resulted in a lower loss rate for new American pilots. Incoming
Soviet pilots, on the other hand, could learn only by word-of-mouth from
experienced pilots. Even this was difficult, as the Soviet leadership was unwilling
to admit even to members o f its own military, that Soviet pilots were flying in

As mentioned previously, claims made by either side, both likely inflated, are not the focus o f
this work, but do show the skill o f both sides.
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Korea. Consequently, Soviet pilots “stepped on the same rake” as their
predecessors, making the learning curve very steep. After each rotation American
pilots were facing rookie Soviets. This disservice done by Soviet high command
to its pilots is best illustrated with the example o f the 97* lAD, who rotated into
Antung in early 1952. Within four months o f their arrival in Korea, the squadron
was nearly decimated. This prompted calls from Soviet field commanders for
better training or a pilot-based rotation. Nothing was ever done. It was far easier
for a huge military like the Soviet Union to rotate whole units rather then single
pilots.^^ Lt General Lobov, head o f the 64* lAK (Fighter Air Corp) in Korea
expressed his dismay.
People were replaced in the 64* LAK by relieving an entire
division at a time. Arriving replacements had only a vague idea of combat
tactics. This caused newly arrived units to lose many rookie pilots.
Besides, participation by the VVS in the war was secret and was
concealed from our own citizens. Experience gained at the expense of our
pilots lives was studied by the VVS and PVO officers, but was kept
strictly confidential
In addition, in many air units, flight safety, rather then combat
training, enjoyed high priority. Air commanders of all ranks were forced
to simplify training. For example, training flights were made in close
combat formations, and, as a rule, with external tanks that limited
maneuverability. Mock air battles during training were waged against
targets that were not maneuvering or mounting any opposition. We
addressed higher authorities’ criticizing this faulty system of training and
replacing pilots. But all remained as it was. It was simpler to move entire
divisions with a stroke o f a pen, rather then to train every regiment, every
pilot, for coming battles.
Despite the highly centralized Soviet military model, the Soviet Union
declined to coordinate with either the Chinese or the North Koreans air forces,
regardless o f the fact the two former countries maintained a joint air command
Zhang, Xiam ong Red Wings Over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea.
(Texas A& M Press, College Station, TX, 2002) pg 140
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infrastructure. For political cooperation never materialized reasons, though
pushed for by Soviet field commanders. Stalin believed this would expose the
Soviet Union’s participation in the conflict.^^ This lack o f cooperation created
problems on a number o f occasions, such as Chinese or North Korean anti-aircraft
artillery firing on Soviet M iG’s or Soviet M iG’s firing upon Chinese or North
Korean aircraft. Many Soviet leaders believe this lack of cooperation, coupled
with Stalin’s reluctance to participate in offensive air operations, the reason for
the dismal performance by their Communist allies.
Soviet pilots operated from Chinese bases just across the Yalu River from
North Korea, this in part to keep them safe from American bombers who were not
to cross the river. American accounts say this gave the Soviets an advantage in
combat. Communist pilots, they claim, could climb to high altitude withins China
and make diving firing passes on American aircraft across the border, and then
execute a climb to the north back to their sanctuary. Conversely, Soviet pilots
believed American pilots to hold the advantage. “When they [Americans] found
themselves at a disadvantage, they quickly went toward the sea and from there,
after choosing a convenient moment and taking advantageous position they could
engage without hindrance. Our adversary was restricted by the Chinese border. In
spite o f this, our pilots went deep into the south, and the Americans crossed the
Yalu, attacking our aircraft during takeoff and landings.”^^ Some historians have
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claimed that this attacking of Soviet M iG’s on take off and landings “puts the
Soviet-American kill ratio in air to air combat in a somewhat different light”^"*
The MiG-15 was by most reports, roughly the equal o f the F-86. It was
clearly superior to aircraft such as the Australian Meteor or the straight winged F80’s o f the USAF. Designed along the same lines, it was usually the better pilot
who prevailed in combat between the M iG -15 and the F-86. Each had distinct
advantages that their respective pilots attempted to exploit, while the other
attempted to take advantage o f their foes weakness. Korea was perhaps the last
true traditional dog fighting war.
Soviet participation in the Korean War, exclusively flying the MiG-15,
was impressive. Though kill claims are highly disputed, the Soviets do admit
losing 345 M iG’s to all causes, while USAF records show 971 total aircraft lost,
with 103 F-86’s being lost in aerial c o m b a t.T a k in g into account the inflation of
kills and reduction o f aerial losses, Soviet and American pilots were well matched
in both skill and technology. Most pilots on both sides were veterans o f the
Second World War, some Soviet pilots scoring over 60 kills against the Germans.
Clearly skill, not technology was the deciding factor in these first aerial battles of
the jet age. This was also perhaps the last war in which jet propelled aircraft
would duel with guns against each other in a traditional sense. After Korea,
development o f air-to-air missiles would forever change the nature of aerial
warfare.
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C hapter VI

The MiG-21 and the Air War in Southeast Asia

When, in retaliation for the Gulf o f Tonkin incident, American Navy and
Air Force aircraft began flying strikes against North Vietnam, it was noted that up
to thirty Chinese supplied MiG-17’s^^ (NATO codename Fresco) were parked at
airfields throughout North Vietnam. American pilots were warned to be on the
look out for the small M iG’s. On April 4**^, 1965, US pilots were attacked for the
first time by North Vietnamese MiG-17’s with inconclusive results. Each side
claims to have shot the other down, but American pilots are credited with three
kills that day.^^ The first undisputed kill o f the conflict came nearly two months
later when USN F-4B Phantom from VF-21 destroyed a M iG-17 with an AIM-7.
North Vietnamese MiG pilots became increasingly aggressive during the
ensuing months. Using their small nimble MiG-17’s the North Vietnamese pilots
turned inside o f the larger American aircraft and then attacked them with cannon
fire. During the summer o f 1965 no less then five North Vietnamese M iG’s were
downed by American fighters. However, the Vietnamese also succeeded in
shooting down at least one American fighter during the summer o f 1965 and
another in November o f the same year. These losses were too high for the North

The M iG -17 is a small aircraft resembling the M iG -15, o f which it was a further refinement. It
has a more powerful engine, a larger, more swept tail and larger more swept wings. It was not
capable o f supersonic flight, nor did it carry air-to-air missiles.
ACIG.org Korean war database
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Vietnamese Air Force (NVAF); and the MiG pilots entered a training period,
making mock attacks on strike packages before escaping into sanctuary zones. It
was not until the spring o f 1966 that the VNAF began to aggressively target
American aircraft a^ain. Also in the spring o f 1966, the VNAF received their first
MiG-21 (NATO codename FISHBED) interceptors from China and the Soviet
Union. Though initially they experienced high losses, the MiG-21 would be the
plane o f choice for thirteen o f the VNAF sixteen aces. One pilot, Nguyen Van
Coc, would be credited with at least nine kills, perhaps more, until his death in
1

9

7

2

98

MiG-21, in the hands o f the few experienced Vietnamese pilots, was

a formidable threat for American aircrews over North Vietnam.
The air war over North Vietnam provided both belligerents, American and
Communist, a laboratory in which to test new weapons o f the Cold War. It was
the first time American pilots were threatened with surface to air missiles, missile
equipped interceptors and a highly developed modem air defense network. It was
the first use o f US missile equipped fighters, B-52 Stratofortresses, precision
guided weapons and high altitude reconnaissance aircraft. Each country used the
on and off nature of the war over Vietnam to learn lessons, analyze them, and
quickly devise a new tactic.
The Americans, in particular, struggled with the MiG threat. During the
early years o f the war the kill ratio was 2:1 in favor o f the Americans, a long cry
from the claimed 10:1 in Korea. By effectively using down time offered by the
peace negotiations, the US Navy raised this ratio to 8:1 by 1972. This was in large
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part due to its intense, hands-on study o f the M iG’s capability. In large part, the
low kill rate was due to US air power tacticians miscalculating the evolving
nature o f aerial warfare. American pilots were no longer proficient in ACM (Air
Combat Maneuvering) i.e. dogfighting. Instead they relied on weapons ill-suited
to the conflict over North Vietnam. In contrast, the North Vietnamese had the
appropriate weapons; they struggled with training and deploying effective pilots
in a war zone. Both sides would struggle throughout the war to achieve victory in
the air, and while the final outcome can be debated, both sides were valiant in
attaining their goals.
Later to serve in air forces the world over the MiG-21, gained its initial
combat experience over the jungles o f North Vietnam. It performed admirably in
the face o f overwhelming American numerical and qualitative superiority. While
suffering heavily under the guns o f the Americans, MiG-21 ’s are credited with a
minimum o f 45 kills.^^ The development and design o f the MiG-21 is a key aspect
in understanding the successes and drawbacks of the aircraft in the war over
North Vietnam.

MiG Enters Mach Two

Aviation grew in leaps and bounds in the twenty years preceding the late
1950’s. Soviet military theorists as well as aircraft designers learned much about
the correct implementation o f airpower from the conflict in Korea. However, the
^ American eind Vietnamese kill claims do not come close to matching and, as stated before, for
the purpose o f this work will only be used sparingly. If one is to believe Vietnamese claims, over
120 American aircraft were downed by M iG -21’s. MiG-21 units pg 89-90
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Soviet Union was not as technologically advanced as the West which was
beginning to plan fighters and bombers beyond the capabilities of the Soviets. In
particular, the American development and deployment of the B-47 Stratojet put
fear into the Soviet military. The B-47, capable o f flying around the world, could
cruise at Mach 0.9 rendering the M iG -15, its close cousin the MiG-17 (NATO
codename FRESCO), and the newly developed M iG-19 (NATO codename
FARMER) all but o b s o l e t e . E v e n more worrisome was the nearly complete B52 Stratofortress. I f s cruising altitude would preclude any defense the Soviets
could mount. This, coupled with the growing nuclear tensions between the newly
formed NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances, led the Soviet Air Force and the
TsAGI (Central Air and Hydrodynamics Research Institute, assigned to work with
MiG on the project) to scramble for a new fighter.
The M iG -15 proved to be a formidable opponent from experience from
Korea, especially in the hands o f an experienced pilot. It also proved that tactical
air warfare could still be fought in a close-in battle of maneuver. Turning,
acceleration, rate o f climb and situational awareness were still assets to be valued.
On top o f this, the new threat from American intercontinental bombers had to be
addressed. Therefore, in March o f 1953, an order was put forth by the Ministry
for Aircraft Production (MAP) for an aircraft capable of reaching speeds in excess
o f 2,000km/h and at altitudes o f 20,000 meters while carrying range-only radar,
air-to-air missiles and heavy cannons.

As if this was not difficult, the aircraft

had to be small, lightweight, have conventional flying characteristics, be
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maneuverable and operate from unprepared surfaces. This created a large problem
for MiG and the TsAGI. Primarily, no engine yet existed in the Soviet Union that
could propel an aircraft to such speeds. The small size of the aircraft was also a
problem as it restricted both the size o f engine and fuel capacity. MiG had just
finished designing the M iG-19, an aircraft meant to intercept high flying bombers.
However, at the conclusion o f the design and acceptance by the VVS, the M iG-19
was deemed only a marginal success. It had become too heavy to fly fast and be
an effective dogfighting p l a t f o r m . I t was also far too complex for the conscript
mechanics to maintain.
Design o f the airframe came first, after which an appropriate sized engine
was to be developed. It was during the late 1950’s that the TsAGI reached the
height o f its influence and, as a result, much o f the research to design the airframe
was done in conjunction with MiG and TsAGI. During high speed wind tunnel
tests, the Institute had discovered two approaches to high speed wing platforms.
First, the traditional MiG swept back wing, similar to the wings found on the
MiG-15, -17, and -19. If swept to the appropriate angle, the wing would provide
stability needed to operate in the subsonic, transonic and supersonic regions. The
benefits o f this design included ease of manufacture and decreased research effort.
Another design explored by MiG and TsAGI was the delta wing.
Delta wing research within the Soviet Union was virtually nonexistent.
During the late 1930’s, some o f research was conducted, but dealt with slow,
prop-driven aircraft. Luftwaffe research documents captured at the end of the war
had led the TsAGI to test the feasibility o f the design. It was not known if the
Butowski pg 81
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wing would offer enough stability at supersonic speeds yet offered little drag. The
delta wing was shown to be much more agile than the swept wing. The TsAGI
proved it to be stable in the trans-and -supersonic region, but it suffered from high
landing and fast takeoff speed and bad stall characteristics. Research soon proved
the addition o f conventional horizontal tail surfaces remedied these problems
without adverse effects.

While not a true delta wing design (it had conventional

elevators), it offered the versatility needed by the VVS.
To test both designs in real world conditions, aircraft with both wing
designs were built as flying testbeds. The swept wing Ye-2 rolled out o f GAZ-155
in February 1955 for its first test flight and in late May, the delta wing Ye-4 flew
for the first time.^^"^ Performance o f the Ye-4 verified the conclusions drawn by
both MiG and the TsAGI. The delta configuration was superior in all aspects,
except for flat out speed. This was not deemed a huge obstacle. The engine that
powered both prototypes, the VK-7, was highly underpowered. Coupled with the
correct engine, MiG was convinced its design could exceed the 2,000km/h mark.
Engine design was assigned to the newly founded Tumansky Bureau. The
bureau built on existing data from the defunct Mikulin bureau to create the RD11, an engine that was exceptional for the time. The RD-11 created a thrust to
weight ratio o f nearly 6:1, an outstanding number for the day. It was a simple
design, with only 3,500 parts and very importantly for MAP, was highly reliable.
Reliability and durability are two very different assets when dealing with
jet engines. Reliability is what keeps the aircraft in the air and in combat.
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Durability determines how long a particular engine can operate. In the Soviet
system, reliability was stressed above durability. An aircraft engine in the Soviet
system had a very short time between overhauls, usually around 300 hours. In
comparison, American aircraft engines required a complete overhaul after 1500
hours. This meant the engine was removed from the airframe for a thorough re
build. However, the nature o f the Soviet supply and maintenance system dictated
a low turn overhaul time. Combat units were not afforded the level of
maintenance support as their Western counterparts, in part due to the limited
education o f the average Soviet conscript. Instead o f overhauling equipment such
as engines within the unit, the Soviet system prescribed a unit to draw new
equipment from storage depots. The Soviets expected that any offensive
operations would require only half of the hours before a major overhaul. If
replaced when nearing the half way mark, all engines would be fresh enough to
complete the assigned objectives in case of war. Thus, a Soviet engine was rebuilt
on a much higher level than at individual unit level. Consequently, the quality of
rebuild is better, but more importantly, allows the engine to be worked much
harder, though for a shorter time, then its Western counterpart. Thus, though the
Soviet engines were less sophisticated, they performed roughly the same as
Western powerplants.^^^ The RD-11 fit the needs of the Soviet system perfectly.
Though it needed a major overhaul quite often, it produced good thrust and good
reliability.
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Sketch o f the MiG-21
The West received its first look at the new MiG designs during the
Tushino Airshow in May o f 1956 when a Ye-2 and Ye-4 passed over the crowd.
Interesting to note, the West believed the Ye-2, the swept wing version, to have
already entered mass production over the delta winged Ye-4. In fact, NATO had a
new codename for the Ye-2, Faceplate.
Tests continued with small airframe and engine changes until the first true
pre-production MiG-21, the Ye-6, took flight in May o f 1958. It was powered by
an improved version o f the Tumansky engine, the R-11F300. Catastrophe struck
on Ye-6’s seventh test flight when, upon reaching 18,000 meters, the compressor
blades within the engine exploded, destroying the aircraft’s hydraulic systems on
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the aircraft. Test pilot Nefydrov attempted a dead-stick landing but failed and died
o f his bums a short time later.
Crash investigation attributed the cause o f the accident to poor design in
the nose cone/intake. When an aircraft flies at supersonic speeds shock waves are
created by the air. The engine cannot use air moving at supersonic speed as the
shock waves will tear the engine apart. Therefore, the air must be slowed to an
appropriate speed and volume. As supersonic intake design was in its infancy in
the Soviet Union, little was knovm about the cure to this problem. Eventually it
was decided that the intake spike would be variable to adjust to the appropriate
needs of the engine. After this issue was resolved the aircraft was ordered into
production as the MiG-2 IF in December of 1958.
The MiG-2 IF was armed with two 30mm NR-30 cannons carrying 60
rounds apiece and was linked to a radar ranging sight. Interestingly, the MiG-2 IF
could not fire guided air-to-air missiles, despite MAP’s requirement to do so. It
was rudimentary in both avionics and capability and unsurprisingly only 40 were
produced. The next version, the MiG-2 IF -13 was the first truly successful MiG2 1 109

Able to fire the new reverse-engineered AA-2 Atoll missiles, the MiG2 IF -13 was the first MiG-21 to be exported outside of the Soviet Union. To
reduce weight, one cannon was removed and magazine capacity was halved. It
apparently handled well, and was benign in flight, though it was only capable of a
7g turn. The aircraft also featured an autopilot, threat warmng receiver and a
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seventeen percent increase in fuel capacity. It offered a highly reliable, simple
Mach 2 capable, missile carrying fighter to foreign countries. The MiG-2 IF -13
was produced in large quantities and license produced in India, Czechoslovakia
and reverse engineered in China.
The next generation MiG-21, the -P , -PF and -PFM versions were the
most successful. This was the generation most widely in service with the North
Vietnamese Air Force. All of these versions did away with the cannon
completely, much as the US had done with its F-4 Phantom II. A larger radar was
installed in the cannons place^^\ Structural improvements allowed these MiG-2 Is
to stress the airframe to 8.5g’s. A more powerful version of the Tumansky RD-11
engine was also installed. Later, a two seat training variant, the MiG-21 US,
capable o f firing AA-2 Atoll infra-red missiles was designed. It was assigned the
NATO codename MONGOL. In the end, over 12,000 MiG-21 ’s have been built,
with construction continuing in China.
Further versions o f MiG-21 ’s were designed, but were too late to serve in
Vietnam. However, the MiG-21 still flies with many countries. Some countries,
such as Romania, have opted to discontinue flying their more expensive aircraft,
such as the MiG-29 or -23, in favor o f the cheaper, more easily maintained MiG21. Companies such as Israeli Aircraft Industries upgrade MiG-21 ’s with modem
avionics and fire control systems at a fraction of the price o f buying new aircraft.
lAI coupled with Romania to produce the Lancer, the most advanced version of
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the MiG-21 to date.

MIG-MAPO (the company MiG is under presently) is

offering an upgrade that it hopes can help pull MiG out of its current economic
woes. These upgrades include new high power Doppler radar systems, glass
cockpits and the ability to fire guided air-to ground munitions. The MIG-MAPO
upgrade also includes the RD-33 engine, the same engine that powers the MiG29. For both companies upgrades includes reinforcement o f the airframe to
withstand more flight hours. The interest in these upgrade options is, in part, due
to the versatility and reliability of the original airframe, but is also because the
M iG-21 is a forgiving and easy aircraft to fly. This is evidenced by the large
number o f MiG-21 ’s flown by civilians in the US.

The MiG-21 in Vietnam

Appearing to intercept a flight o f F-4’s in April, 1966, the MiG-21’s
changed the threat environment over North Vietnam. Since 1965 North
Vietnamese pilots of the 92 U* Fighter Regiment had been training in the Soviet
Union to fly the MiG-21. Initially the NVAF received the gun-less MiG-2 IF -13
from the Soviets; however they were augmented by cannon carrying MiG-2 IPF’s,
arriving in the spring o f 1966. At first the NVAF command was reluctant to allow
its new high speed interceptor to engage manned American aircraft. The MiG-21
pilots became acquainted with their new mounts by intercepting and destroying
unmanned American Firebee reconnaissance drones. The first Firebee was
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downed in March o f 1966. The North Vietnamese used the experience to gain
knowledge as to the use of their radar and missile systems. These skills would
prove valuable when engaging manned aircraft. By April, the NVAF command
structure felt confident enough to allow its pilots to attempt intercepts on
American manned aircraft.
During April and May o f that year, MiG-2 Is participated in numerous
interceptions, firing over 14 Atoll missiles. However, they achieved no hits and
suffered numerous losses due to enemy fire and fuel starvation.

It was proving

difficult for the inexperienced NVAF pilots to manage the radar and fire control
systems at the same time. The system in the MiG-21 required the MiG pilot to
keep the target in his radar sights, while firing an Atoll, a skill that took much
practice. MiG-21 pilots did not score their first kill until June, when they downed
a solitary F-105D Thunderchief.
Soon new tactics were implemented. Having transitioned from the highly
maneuverable but slower M iG-17, most NVAF MiG-21 pilots had failed to
exploit their new aircrafts potential. They were also using tactics that had been
developed for the MiG-17, tactics that did not work in the MiG-21. It was decided
that the MiG-17’s and -2 T s should operate in concert, exploiting each others
strength. Therefore, the MiG-17’s would patrol at low altitudes, under 1,500
meters, while the MiG-21 ’s would patrol at higher altitudes, up to 3,000 meters.
The MiG-17’s would engage and disperse the American formations with cannon
fire, while the high flying MiG-21 would dive from above and engage stragglers

Toperczer, Istvan. MiG-21 Units o f the Vietnam War. Osprey Publishing. (Oxford Publishing,
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that had broken away.^^"^ This tactic was very reminiscent o f Soviet MiG-15
tactics during the Korean War.
MiG pilots over Vietnam enjoyed distinct advantages over their American
rivals. They were intimately familiar with the country’s terrain, particularly the
mountain ranges, and exploited this at every advantage. They were also flying
over their own air defense network and thus they could drag pursuing enemy
aircraft over SAM and AAA sites. This tactic was not without peril for the MiG,
as the NVAF pilot ran a risk o f being shot down by the anti-aircraft installation
himself. O f utmost importance was the vast network o f radar and ground control
sites throughout North Vietnam. These allowed the MiG pilot to receive up-todate, comprehensive information, and allowed the GCI to vector the MiG into
optimum firing position without the MiG pilots having to turn on his own radar.
During Operation Rolling Thunder (1965 to 1968), as the air offensive over North
Vietnam strikes against airfields were prohibited. There was also a 30 mile buffer
zone between China and Vietnam in which US aircraft were not permitted to fly.
NVAF MiG pilots took full advantage o f these “safe zones” when planning and
launching attacks.
Though the MiG-21 ’s succeeded in downing only 10 American aircraft in
1966, they intercepted 192 flights, causing 107 of them to jettison their bombs
before reaching their target.

These numbers show that despite the Fishbeds poor

performance in combat, it was causing disruption. Frustrated that the MiG’s could

Toperczer pg
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not be attacked on the ground, the USAF developed a plan to ambush and destroy
the MiG-21 ’s in the air.

I

. J. .

•

116

A North Vietnamese MiG-21

Operation Bolo was conceived by Col. Robin Old, commander of the 8^
Tactical Fighter Wing in Udon, Thailand. His plan was to ambush NVAF MiG21 ’s by mimicking F-105 ingress routes, call signs and formations in F-4
Phantoms. When the M iG’s intercepted what they believed were F-105 fighterbombers, the F-4’s would engage and destroy the MiG’s. The plan required a
large number o f American fighters including 14 flights o f F-4’s, 6 flights o f F105D for SEAT) (Suppression o f Enemy Air Defenses), 4 flights of F -104
Starfighters and numerous flights o f support tankers and AW ACS.

The key to

surprising the M iG’s was twofold. First, the MiG’s needed to be tricked into
engaging the group. This was accomplished by imitating F-105 characteristics,
such as speed, altitude and call signs. Once this was accomplished, the escape
route back to their airfields and into the protected airspace near the Chinese

Artwork courtesy o f Tom Cooper, editor o f ACIG.org
^ A ces and Aerial Victories: The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1965-1973, (The
Albert Simpson Historical Research Center Air University and Office o f Air Force History. 1976.)
Pg 35-37
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border must be cut off by another flight o f F-4’s. This is a variation of the
hammer and anvil infantry tactic. One group, mimicking the F-105 would be the
hammer. Upon realizing their mistake, the MiG’s would rapidly attempt to
disengage and flee. They would run into the other group o f F-4’s, the anvil.
Between these two groups, the M iG’s would be under pressure from both sides,
much like a piece o f metal between a hammer and anvil.
Having learned the lessons o f 1966, F-4 crews were briefed to not attempt
to engage in turning dogfights with the MiG’s but rather use their superior
acceleration and radar to achieve a firing solution. This operation required a large
degree o f cooperation between the flights o f fighters. The mission was set for
January

2,

1967.

USAF F-4 Phantom II 118

The weather on the 2 January proved less than favorable. Though a one
hour delay was instituted, it was decided to go ahead with the mission. Col. Robin
Olds led the first flight near Phuc Yen airfield, hoping to entice the MiG’s into
battle. However, the M iG ’s did not respond until the second flight of F-4 s.
118
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mimicking F -105’s appeared. The weather was bad enough that part o f the
covering force could not cover their assigned sector and did not see any MiG’s.
Regardless, a large air battle developed with a fifteen mile radius of Phuc Yen
airfield resulting in seven MiG-21’s downed with no losses to the USAF F-4’s.
According to Col Olds, “We outflew, outshot and outfought them.” ^*^ The loss
was considerable for the VNAF, as they lost nearly half of their sixteen MiG-21’s.
For the next few days the USAF continued its deception operations and destroyed
an additional two MiG-21’s.
After a terrible mauling at the hands o f the USAF, the 92

Fighter

Regiment was given a reprieve by the NVAF high command. Operation of the
MiG-21 virtually ceased. Attacks by its stable mate, the M iG-17, continued
unabated despite suffering great losses; seven losses in one day on April 13, 1967.
Though MiG-21 ’s occasionally operated in concert with MiG-17’s in the next few
months, they were not as prominent as their brethren.
During Operation Bolo the losses suffered by the VNAF were expensive
in terms of pilots, not aircraft. There were a number o f MiG-21 in crates in
Haiphong awaiting transport and assembly to replace aircraft losses. Both the
Soviet Union and China continued to provide North Vietnam with a nearly
endless supply o f weapons, including M iG’s. At times, the number of aircraft
exceeded the number o f pilots.

Pilots, however, took more time to replace and

train. Though MiG-21 ’s did not participate much in aerial combat in 1967 or
A ces and Aerial Victories Pg 41
Topceczer pg 79 Sometimes though, they did not arrive as ordered. Soviet techmcians, upon
opening crates o f Soviet sent M iG-2 IFF were shocked to discover that, as the M iG’s passed
through China by rail, their sophisticated radars were stripped and replaced by inferior Chinese
copies.
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1968, a number were shot down by US Navy picket ships as they attempted to
either bomb or fly reconnaissance near the naval picket line. On November 1,
1968, President Johnson called a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam and thus
ended the first chapter in aerial combat over Vietnam. Engagements between
M iG’s and US aircraft would not renew until May 8^"^, 1972, when President
Nixon initiated Operation Linebacker I and II. During this four year lull in
hostilities, both sides vigorously trained and prepared their forces.
The US was eager to reverse the dismal kill ratio it had experienced from
1966 to 1968. The key to reverse this trend was to leam was learning to fight the
M iG-17 and -21 effectively with a fighter (F-4) and missiles (AIM-7 Sparrow)
meant to destroy Soviet bombers. The Navy’s Ault report was issued outlining
steps needed to rectify this situation. Part o f the Ault report called to re-introduce
ACM (air combat maneuvering) to fleet pilots. Meanwhile, in 1967 the CIA
obtained a singular MiG-21 from secret sources.
An initial comparison between the F-4 and the MiG-21 showed the two
aircraft to have comparable turn rates at high speed. While at slower speed the
MiG-21 was slightly superior. A joint team of Navy and Air Force pilots put the
two aircraft through tests in ACM. The MiG-21 won some, while the F-4 won
others. The test however, were far from inconclusive, they showed the deficiency
was not in the aircraft but in the pilots. American pilots had lost the skill
necessary to compete in ACM, relying too heavily on their long range missiles
and radar systems.
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After more comprehensive testing, the large delta wing o f the MiG-21
was shown to bleed energy more quickly then the F-4. This, coupled with the fact
that the turn radius o f MiG-21 and F-4 was similar at high speed, led to a tactic to
defeat the MiG-21. When closing with a MiG-21, an F-4 pilot would initiate a
high g, high-speed turn which the MiG would try to follow and rapidly lose
energy. At a certain point, the F-4 would climb vertically, which the MiG-21
lacked the energy to do, thus the F-4 could roll over and dive into a six o’clock
position on the MiG.^^^ Now that the joint team had discovered the weakness of
the M iG-21, it set out to teach Navy pilots how to kill them.
During the initial testing o f the M iG-21, the US had only one example and
desperately needed more aircraft in order to train its pilots. During the Six Day
War, Israel had acquired a number o f MiG-21 ’s and -17’s through defections,
deceit and capture. Eager to rebuild its air force after the war and unable to secure
its traditional French examples due to sanctions, Israel approached the US with a
deal. The Israelis wanted A-4 and F-4E fighters, as well as tanks and small arms.
In turn, they offered the US not only an ally in the Middle East, but recently
captured MiG’s, SA-2 SAMs and Soviet tanks. Soon the US acquired a number of
M iG’s with which to train its pilots.
The US Navy moved to establish “Top Gun”, an advanced ACM school at
NAS Miramar in California to train its pilots to fight the M iG’s. The pilots were
given the opportunity to fly against the MiG and many were allowed to fly the
M iG ’s. Very quickly. Navy pilots obtained the level of proficiency to counter the

Peebles pg 220
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NVAF threat. The Navy also improved teamwork between the pilot and his
backseat RIO (radar intercept officer). By implementing these changes the Navy
was able to reverse the dismal trend o f its 1966-1968 kill ratio, ending the war
with a respectable 8:1 ratio.
The Air Force did not institute a similar program until 1975 with its
creation o f Red Flag. The only major change the USAF instituted during the lull
in fighting was the specialized training o f the backseater in an F-4. Previously, the
Air Force had simply put pilots in the back. This could cause communication
problems between the pilot and the backseater tended to second guess the pilot.
Soon the Air Force began training specialized WSO (Weapons System Officers,
similar to Navy RIO’s) to operate the radar and fire control systems. This did little
to change the USAF’s dismal record marginally improving to 2.83:1 by the wars
end."^
The North Vietnamese also took advantage o f the four year respite in
fighting. They bolstered both their air defense structure and MiG force. By March
o f 1972, US reconnaissance showed that the NVAF had nearly 100 MiG-2 Us,
that were now divided into two regiments, the 92

and 927^.Addiitionally the

NVAF had 150 MiG-17 and -19’s. By now North Vietnam, boasted the world’s
most sophisticated defense network in the world. Many more SA-2 SAM missile
batteries were constructed since 1968. The NVAF had superb radar coverage
throughout the whole country that in theory, allowed precise guiding o f both MiG
and SAMs. It also allowed the North Vietnamese to detect American aircraft long
before they entered North Vietnamese airspace, thereby allowing MiG’s to be
Peebles pg 231
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positioned. Inherent in this system was the value o f operating over friendly and
familiar territory.
In 1972, despite the ban on bombing North Vietnam, interdiction missions
were flown over Laos. Increasingly, MiG scrambled to thwart these missions,
finally resulting in three MiG kills over Laos. During May o f 1972, the North
formally invaded the South and President Nixon authorized Operation
Linebacker, an attempt to attack the supply centers o f North Vietnam. This
included for the first time, the mining o f Haiphong harbor.
The resumption o f hostilities brought about the fiercest air battles seen in
the Vietnam War. During the month o f May alone, US aircrews were credited
with dovming nearly thirty M iG’s, including nine MiG-21 ’s, while the NVAF
shot down at least ten US aircraft.

Linebacker strikes also included raids

against the MiG bases, that disrupted the organization o f the NVAF greatly.
Accordingly, the leadership in Hanoi called the NVAF leadership to formulate a
plan.
The NVAF decided to adopt a Western style after-action report after each
mission. Information would be shared between the two regiments, something that
had not been done effectively. After each action, successful or not, the pilots
would debrief and share lessons with each other in an organized format. Though
this format is familiar within the US armed forces, it was new to the North
Vietnamese. Cocky pilots were frowned upon, and in some cases removed, from
flight status for lack of respect towards the enemy’s fighting ability.

acig.org database o f kills
Topceczer Pg 61
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Aside from the inexperience o f many o f its young pilots, the NVAF
suffered from a host o f other problems. These included a poor command structure.
Command decisions were often slow and ambiguous and the information that
flowed to the commanders was often outdated, resulting in orders that made little
sense. Additionally, though the radar net was extensive, it was not the latest
equipment. Often operators could not understand the evolving situation and could
not issue correct orders. In a system that frowns upon individual action, inaction
by ground controllers led to the death o f many pilots. All o f these issues had to be
overcome if the NVAF was to reverse the downward trend of 1972.
In late 1972, the NVAF became increasingly obsessed with shooting down
the high flying B-52 Stratofortresses with a MiG-21. When Operation Linebacker
II began in December of 1972, the NVAF believed itself prepared to down one of
the bombers with their new MiG-2 IM F’s. As B-52’s flew at night and at high
altitudes, a select cadre had to be trained for these highly dangerous night
interceptions. Thirteen pilots were selected and trained to attempt to down a B-52.
The plan was racked with problems; MiG bases were now under daily
attack by American F-111 ’s. Numerous time the MiG’s scrambled numerous
times to intercept the B-52’s, though none were reported shot down.
Embarrassingly, one MiG-21 was shot dovm by the tail gunner of a B-52 on the
18 December and another on 24 December. Their tactics failing, the NVAF told
their pilots to ram the B-52’s.^^^ Finally, on the 27 December a number o f MiG21’s were scrambled to intercept an incoming B-52 flight. Pilot Pham Tuan
describes the incident:
Topeczer pg 65
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When I saw a yellow light in front o f me, I increased my speed to
1200 km/h and climbed to 10,000 meters, where the B-52’s were
cruising. I radioed to the command, “I have the target in sight, request
order for attack”, the response came “You have permission to fire twice,
then escape quickly”.
“The Americans were holding formation, keeping separation of
approximately two to three kilometers. I made last minute checks to my
missiles, and when I reached the level of the third B-52,1 pushed the fire
button on the control stick, launching two heat seeking missiles from a
distance o f two kilometers. Huge flames were visible around the second
B-52 as I broke sharply to the left and descended to 2000 meters before
landing at Yen Bai. The attacked formation immediately dropped their
loads and returned to base. The crew o f the hit B-52 was killed^^^
This loss, however, was attributed by the USAF to a SAM, rather then a MiG-21.
As the year progressed, the NVAF began to stem its losses. But by the
years end lost forty-three aircraft, including at least thirty-eight MiG-21’s. The
rapid expansion o f the NVAF from the bombing halt of 1968 to Operation
Linebacker brought a vast influx o f new pilots. Led by a cadre o f very
experienced older pilots, these pilots did not fair well in combat, especially as
many o f the US aircrews had flown and gained experience during the strikes of
1966-1968. The last US aircraft lost to M iG’s was recorded December 28, 1972,
when a MiG-21 downed a US Navy RA-5C Vigilante.
The poor quality o f the majority of the North Vietnamese pilots was
obvious. They were unable to adapt to the changing tactics and aggressive nature
o f US aircrews during Operation Linebacker I and II. Records kept by the top
Soviet advisor to the NVAF show that only half of the pilots had more than 450
hours logged. These records showed that the NVAF had been all but destroyed by
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the air strikes, with only forty-seven o f the remaining 187 aircraft operationally fit
for combat.

This is only half the story.

North Vietnam produced thirteen aces during the war with top scoring
Nguyen Van Coc scoring at least nine. They also proved that the MiG-21 was a
formidable foe in combat with the right pilot in the cockpit. The US admitted to
43 losses to North Vietnamese MiG-21 ’s, most from 1972 and later. The North
Vietnamese claimed to have downed at least double that number with their MiG21 ’s. The conflict was bitter and not the one -sided ordeal the Bekka Valley
would become ten years later. The air war over Vietnam was a hard fought battle
by both sides and it was the superior pilot, not the aircraft, who won every
engagement.

Topcezer pg 67
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C hapter VII

The MiG-23 and the Air War over the Bekka Valley

Israeli Air Force (lAF) operations during the 1982 Operation Peace for
Galilee against the Syrian Air Force (SyAF) are representative of third generation
fighter aircraft and tactics.

The Israeli invasion o f southern Lebanon was in

response to increased activity by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).
In May o f 1982 an assassination attempt was carried out London by elements of
the PLO on the Israeli ambassador to the UK in. In turn, Israel reacted with
punitive strikes against PLO targets inside o f Lebanon. At the time, the PLO was
embroiled not only with a quasi-war against Israel, but involved in a civil war
within Lebanon. The PLO was supported by Syria in the Lebanese Civil War
against the Christian militias, who in turn were, supported by Israel.
After the assassination attempt by the PLO hostilities escalated. Punitive
strikes into southern Lebanon prompted Syria to massively reinforce its SA-6
SAM batteries in Lebanon; eventually 19 such sites were established.

The

gesture was not meant as an offensive threat by the Syrians, as they did not want
direct action against the Israelis. Rather it was probably meant as a deterrent to

It should be noted the both the lA F and SyAF employed second generation aircraft such as the
F-4 Phantom II by the Isrealis and the MiG-21 Fishbed by the Syrians. However for the purpose o f
this work, effort will be made to concentrate upon combat with only third generation aircraft.
Hurley, Mattew CIC U SA F A, “The Bekka Valley Air Battle, June 1982: Lessons
M isleam ed?” (Aerospace Power Journal, Winter 1989) URL
<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj89/hurley.html>
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flirther punitive strikes. Arab nations had learned well the lessons of a
compressive and stout

umbrella as a deterrent to lAF aircraft strikes.

During the “War o f Attrition” (1967-1970) between Israel and the Arab
nations, particularly Egypt the lAF, suffered heavily from SAM’s. Indeed
according to notoriously conservative lAF records twenty-two Israeli aircraft
were downed by SAMs. This was a great loss to the lAF, but the Yom Kippur
War o f 1973 would show the lAF the true potential o f a well built missile
umbrella; as forty lAF aircraft (or fourteen percent o f the total lAF inventory) was
lost to both AAA and SAMs within the first forty-eight hours o f the conflict.
Thus, the build-up o f Syrian SA-6 SAM sites in southern Lebanon was
unacceptable to the lAF, regardless of Syrian intentions. This, coupled with
increased cross border activity by the PLO, led to the June 6, 1982 invasion of
Lebanon.
After the serious losses to enemy air defenses during the Yom Kippur
War, the LAF took seriously the threat of Syrian SA-6’s. In preparation for the
invasion Israel trained heavily against mock SAM sites it built in the Negev
desert. Israel was determined not repeat the dismal performance o f nine years
earlier. On June 9 the lAF attacked the SAM sites located in the strategic Bekka
Valley, destroying within ten minutes 17 of the 19 SA-6 sites and many more SA3 and SA-2 sites, while suffering no losses. The remaining two SA-6 sites were
destroyed in follow-up strikes the next morning. With the Israeli attack on Syrian
SAM sites and their subsequent destruction, Syria had no choice but to engage the

SAM - Surface to Air m issile
Hurley
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lAF in the air. Thus the stage was set for the largest air battles since the end of the
Second World War. This battle was also to be the baptism of fire for both
American and Soviet third generation aircraft, among them the Soviet MiG-23
(NATO codename FLOGGER).

Baptism of Fire for the Flogger

Soviet aircraft designers during the late 1960’s and early 1970’s strove to
achieve equilibrium with new American fighter aircraft such as the F-14 Tomcat,
F-111 Aardvark (or as the Australians refer to it, “the Pig”) and eventually the F15 Eagle and F-16 Fighting Falcon. Though a successful design, the MiG-21
FISHBED would be outclassed by the newest generation of Western aircraft both
in speed and weapons systems. To create an aircraft capable of engaging the
newest generation of Western aircraft, Soviet Frontal Aviation, through the TsKB,
issued an order for a new fighter in 1964.^^^ The aircraft was to be faster than the
Fishbed and able to carry a greater load. Additionally it would have a BVR
(Beyond Visual Range) capability similar to the American F-4 Phantom. Within
the established tradition o f Frontal Aviation, it was also required to operate from
improvised runways.
Two new technologies were explored to allow both high speed flight, and
low takeoff and landing speeds needed to operate from improvised fields. The
first techonlgy was variable thrust engines capable o f directing thrust downward
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to help lift the a i r c r a f t / T h e second was a variable geometry winged aircraft
capable o f “swinging” its wings as the aerodynamic situation demanded. These
requirements led the MiG design team to create a fighter technically more
advanced then anything the Soviet Union had fielded.
The Soviet Union had been aware of the developments made at the
NASA/NACA research facilities in Langley, Virginia, through both secret and
open sources, towards variable sweep winged aircraft. Variable angle wings
allowed aircraft to “swing” their wings to the demands needed for both high lift
situations, such as takeoff and also low drag situations, such as supersonic flight,
within the same sortie. This was exactly what was needed for the new fighter
aircraft. Concurrently, a project was underway to use variable thrust engines to
meet the same demand. Both designs eventually resulted in prototype aircraft and,
in much the same fashion used by Western designers, a competition was initiated.
On July 9, 1967 both aircraft displayed their technolgy for the public at a military
air show in Domodedovo. The variable geometry (vg) aircraft was designated
Flogger by NATO while the variable thrust engined prototype was labeled
Faithless."^
The VG aircraft demonstrated superiority over the variable thrust aircraft
during the ensuing competition. Though meeting the requirements of the TsKB,
the variable thrust aircraft fell short o f the performance o f the VG aircraft. It
simply did not have the fuel efficiency, its engines took up too much room within
the fuselage and the weight of the systems cut into payload capacity. The V G
This technology was later used in the Soviets answer to the British Harrier, the Yak-38
FORGER that was adopted by the Soviet N avy in the 1970’s.
Butowski pg 101
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aircraft won the competition easily and its design was accepted by the TsKB as
the MiG-23S.

Sketch of MiG-23 and two seat MiG-23UB 136

First delivered to VVS units in 1972, the newly designated MiG-23S was
issued in limited numbers. The final tally totaled around 100 aircraft.

Though

the MiG-23 aerodynamically won the design competition, the radar and fire
control systems that would allow the BVR capability dictated by the TsKB were
not ready to be fielded. The radar unit, (NATO codename HIGHLARK), was
designed with data and hardware acquired from the captured remains o f the
Westinghouse AN/AWG-10 in F-4 Phantoms shot down over Vietnam. The

^^^http://www.todo-aviones-com.ar/rusos/mig23/mig-23-scheme.jpg
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HIGHLARK radar unit was quite an advance over the previous JAYBIRD radar
found in later MiG-21 ’s. The HIGHLARK’s Doppler pulse system, operated in
the J band, possessed a search range o f 50 miles and a tracking range o f 35
miles/^^ More importantly, the new radar unit allowed the devolvement o f a
completely new fire control system capable o f firing the new R-23 (NATO
Codename AA-7 APEX) BVR semi-active radar guided missile.
VVS units complained the initial batch o f MiG-23 S’s were underpowered
and lacked the promised acceleration. Thus, when the new MiG-23M was
introduced it was powered by the much more powerful Tumansky R-29-300
engine, making the MiG-23M the first Flogger that was truly defined by its fast
acceleration and high speed. In addition the MiG-23M featured the incorporation
of the HIGHLARK radar and fire control system, a step over the system found in
the MiG-23 S. Soviet airpower theorists learned much from the war in Vietnam,
including the effectiveness o f high speed slashing attacks by MiG-21’s. They also
learned the capability o f the better equipped American F-4’s to engage the nimble
MiG-21, on their own terms by utilizing their higher speed and better radars. Thus
the MiG-23 was a departure from the standard Soviet air superiority fighter. The
MiG-21 was a highly maneuverable, low weight aircraft capable o f turning inside
of, and defeating, most Western fighter in a traditional dogfight. However, the
tactics used by the Americans in Vietnam helped to negate this feature and the
Vietnamese resorted to high speed, single pass slashing tactics. The MiG-23 was
optimized for just this tactic.

Butowski pg 101
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Most Western aircraft that incorporate VG technology, the F-111 and the
F-14 in particular, are highly maneuverable. This was not the case with the MiG23. In fact its wings can only be swept to three preset positions-16deg, 45deg and
72deg- for takeoff/landing, cruise/maneuver and high speed respectively. Pilots
who have flown in or against the Flogger describe it as performing much the same
as the 1960’s vintage American F-104 Starfighter. The Flogger is extremely fast
while climbing and in straight line performance, but not very maneuverable in a
d o g f i g h t . O n e British Tornado pilot, escorting a MiG-23 to an airshow in the
UK during the 1990’s states, ‘T he lack of visibility for the pilot of the Flogger
was plainly obvious, as was its lack o f maneuverability even in this undemanding
environment- the wings were never swept throughout the flight and when it turned
it did so with rigid, angular movements.” ^"^*
This statement came from a Tornado pilot flying a highly maneuverable
VG equipped aircraft and is especially telling. VG technology is incorporated in
the MiG-23 to meet the requirements o f a high speed aircraft capable of operating
from short, improvised landing strips, not to increase its maneuverability. This is
another case o f the Soviet design bureau’s difficulty overcoming the “requirement
pull”, a design implemented to satisfy a requirement, rather than the West’s
tradition o f “technology push” whereby a new technology dictates requirements.
The MiG-23 was a substantial technological leap from the fairly simplistic
MiG-21. The transition o f pilots from one aircraft to the other was not as smooth
as the VVS had hoped; in fact the Flogger’s accidental loss rate was quite
140 Peebles pg 235
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astounding.

Originally, there had been no plans for a two seat trainer version,

but in 1973 TsKB and the VVS began conversion o f a number o f MiG-23 M
airframes to two-seat trainer MiG-23UM’s, to help alleviate some o f these
problems. The aircraft was quite difficult to fly, even by American standards.
The US acquired a number o f M iG’s, including M iG-17’s, -21’s and 23’s,
through sources like Israel (who had received them from defectors) and Egypt
(who in the early 1980’s, began an era o f military friendship with the US). The
M iG’s were put through their paces and treated much as any "black” project
would at the secret airfield near Groom Lake, Nevada. However, the MiG-23
proved to be a difficult aircraft to master even for the experienced pilots o f the
USAJF test squadron based at Groom Lake. On April 26, 1984, Lt General Robert
Bond was killed flying a MiG-23, possibly in a mock interception against the then
new, F-117A Stealth Fighter. According to Air Force reports. Bond was in a high
speed, high-altitude run when he attempted a high-G right turn. As recorded voice
transcripts from the accident report demonstrated. Bond lost control of the aircraft
in a spin he could not recover firom. He was forced to eject, and was subsequently
killed. Investigation o f the accident revealed all systems on the aircraft were
performing normally prior to the departure from controlled flight. The accident
was ruled as pilot error. That Bond was a highly experienced test pilot supported
what had been reported previously by defecting MiG-23 pilots the MiG-23 had a
tendency to spin in high speed, high G situations. ^"*^It is also apparent that the
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Soviet lost many aircraft in similar situations. Also evident was a fault within the
wing pivot mechanism that had a tendency to separate at inopportune times.
Though the MiG-23 was designed as an interceptor/fighter a fighter
bomber version was also created. Though derived from the MiG-23 airftame, it
was given the designation the MiG-27, though NATO did not assign it a new
codename. The MiG-27 had a totally redesigned nose to increase over the nose
visibility and to house new sensors. It also had a greater payload, albeit at a
sacrifice to speed, and carried a new six barrel Gatling 30mm cannon for
attacking armored targets. Importantly the MiG-27 lacked air-to-air radar, though
it retained the ability to fire infra-red guided Atoll missiles.
The MiG-23/27 saw heavy service with the VVS in Afghanistan in the
ground support role. On some occasions the aircrafy were engaged by Pakistani
Air Force F-16’s after crossing the Pakistani frontier, with negative results during
all engagements. Iraq heavily deployed the MiG-23 in its war against Iran in the
1980’s, though information about its success is limited at best. The only true air
battle fought by the MiG-23 was in the Bekka Valley during the 1982 Israeli
invasion of Lebanon.

Due to high maintenance and high accident rates coupled

with low success rates in combat, the MiG-23 was withdrawn from Russian
service in 1997. Perhaps one o f the largest disappointments for MiG OKB, the
Flogger became fodder for the Israeli Air Force in the skies over Lebanon.
The Air War over the Bekka Valley
Spick 478
On January 4*, 1989 two Libyan M iG -23’s were intercepted by F-14 Tomcats from the carrier
N im itz in the G ulf o f Sidra. The resulting engagement ended with both Floggers being downed in
quick succession by the U S N aviators. Taped recording o f that engagement can be found at
http://www.flight-level.com /dogfrght/
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Aerial combat over the skies o f the Bekka Valley in June o f 1982 was
decidedly one-sided. Israel claimed a 100:1 kill ratio over the Syrian Air Force,
greater than kill ratios in 1967 (30:1) or 1973 (50:1).^"^^ Though the purpose of
this study is not to investigate kill ratios, one must take both Syrian and Israeli
claims with a grain o f salt.^^^ Both countries have a propensity to exaggerate their
victories, in fact, most historians and military officials back the claim that Israel
did lose a small number o f aircraft (1-3) to air-to-air combat with the Syrians in
the Bekka Valley.

Any observer to that battle could plainly see that the Syrian

were outfought, however the purpose of this work is to examine the MiG-23’s
role in combat, along with the reasons for the dismal performance by the Syrian
Air Force.
When Israel began strikes against SA-6 batteries within the Bekka Valley,
the Syrian Air Force was obligated to meet the threat posed by the IDF to both
Syria proper and her forces within Lebanon. Syrian pilots in both elderly MiG21 ’s and cutting edge MiG-23M’s met similar fates at the hand of Israeli pilots,
more often than not they were destroyed before even detecting the lAF Fighters.
However, the majority o f these losses were not the fault o f the aircraft, but rather

Van Creveld, Martin. The Sword and the Olive. A Critical History o f the Israeli Defense
Force.(Public Affairs, 1998.) pg 295
A R A N D corporation report to the USAF claims “Indeed, we cannot rule out the possibility
that much o f the press comment that has appeared on the Bekka Valley operation has been the
product o f Israeli disinformation.” Lambeth, Benjamin.M oscow ’s Lessons from the 1982 Lebanon
Air War. (RAND. Project Air Force Report. Santa Monica, CA 1984) Pg 4
N iccolle, David and Tom Cooper. Arab M iG -19 and MiG-21 Units in Combat. (Osprey
Publishing. Oxford. 2004 ) pg 77 At least two MiG-2 F s scored kills against an already damaged
F-4 Phantom and a A -4 Skyhawk.
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the fault o f either the pilots, ground commanders or the Syrian military as a
whole.
Riad Ashkar, an authority on the IDF, in an interview in The Journal o f
Palestinian Affairs during the summer o f 1978, was asked how the MiG-23
compared to new. Western supplied aircraft of Israel. He stated that “The MiG-23
is in some ways superior to the F-4; it is to some extent comparable with the latest
American fighters” ^"*^ These fighter include the F-15 and F-16,both employed by
the Israelis in the Bekka Valley. An anonymous lAF officer took it further saying
“The problem was that [Syrian] pilots didn’t do things at the right time or in the
right place.. .the pilots behaved as if they knew they were going to be shot down
and waited to see to when it was going to happen and not how to prevent it or
attempt to shoot us dow n.. .They could have been flying the best fighter in the
world, but if they flew it the way they were flying we would have shot them down
in exactly the same way. It wasn’t the fault o f the equipment, but rather their
tactics.”

When asked what the lAF learned about Syrian MiG-25 Foxbat

operations lAF commander. General Eitan stated “Answering that question is
difficult, because the Syrians did not know how to fly or operate the MiG-25. If
we had been flying the MiG-25 nobody would have touched us.” ^^^ Even the
Soviets, notorious for institutionalized military thinking, seem to have learned a
lesson from the Bekka Valley campaign. In a TASS release after the war a Soviet
general is quoted as saying “to fully use these capabilities (i.e. the MiG-23), those
Ashkar, Riad and Kassim Jaafar. “Military Options in the Middle East” The Journal o f
Palestine. V ol 7, N o.4 (Summer, 1978) pg 105
Lambeth pg 9
Lambeth pg 31
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who exploit and maintain this equipment must posses comprehensive and deep
k n o w l e d g e . T h e entire performance o f the Syrian Air Force is best described
by Ezer Weizman, former lAF commander: “The human factor will decide the
fate o f war, o f all wars. Not the Mirage (a type o f French supplied lAF fighter),
nor any other plane, and not the screwdriver, or the wrench or radar or missiles or
all the newest technology and electrical innovations. Men-, and not just men of
action, but men of thought. Men for whom the expression ‘by ruses shall ye make
war’ is a philosophy o f life, not just the object of lip service”

If it was not the

fault o f the M iG’s in which the Syrian were flying, why were the losses by the
SyAF so high?.
Israel dominated the airspace over the Bekka Valley in every possible
aspect, this made offensive and even defensive operations by Syria nearly
impossible. Israel had excellent intelligence about Syrian MiG operations.
Lebanon was the first war to make heavy use of RPV (remote piloted vehicle)
technology. Israel had long been developing its own indigenous design. By 1982
Israel had deployed its RPV called, quite fittingly, the Scout. Using its long range
cameras, the Scout was able to relay a real-time picture o f Syrian MiG’s taking
off from airbases within Syria. This information was relayed to an orbiting E-2C
Hawkeye AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft. The
Hawkeye was equipped with an APS-125 radar mounted above the fuselage, able
Lambeth pg 16 The Soviet military seems to have been quite dismayed by the performance o f
their equipment in Syrian hands. Jokes circulated through the Soviet officer staff that during the
war Syria had maintained a departure control for its fighters, but no approach control. This follows
what seem s to be a long tradition o f joking about the performance o f its Arab client states. During
the 1973 war it was joked that new Egyptian tanks were to have back up lights and that the
defense minister, after studying the Soviet success in World War II was still waiting for the long
Russian winter to set in over the Suez.
Lambeth pg 35
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to scan 3 million cubic miles o f airspace, monitor over 200 aircraft
simultaneously and control over 150 engagements at ranges of over 250 miles
A controller sitting within the Hawkeye would relay the information to lAF pilots
who would either engage or egress the area, depending on the situation. Thus,
every move the Syrians made was monitored from takeoff to eventual shoot down
by the lAF.
Syrian pilots however, were trained in the Soviet fashion of GCI (Ground
Control Intercept) engagements. GCI interceptions were dictated to a pilot by a
controller inside a ground radar station. Little room was left for proactive flying.
Additionally, Syrian GCI control also because the radar range was somewhat
limited by the mountainous terrain o f southern Lebanon. Syrian pilots found this
all to be a moot point though, as Israel effectively jammed data and voice link
communication between both GCI and pilot with state o f the art ECM (Electronic
Counter Measures) gear, thus negating any control. Trained in the strict Soviet
system, Syrian pilots found themselves without guidance and flew blindly, not
knowing what to do next. As one Western observer noted T watched a group of
Syrian fighter planes fly figure-eights. They just flew around and around and
obviously had no idea what to do n e x f M e a n w h i l e Israel utilized effectively
employed counter-jamming technology and was able to respond quickly to any
attempt by Syria to jam its communication lines. Israel dominated all aspects
necessary for warfare on a modem battlefield, command, control and
communication (C^).

Hurley
Lambeth pg 9
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Though M iG’s themselves may not have been to blame for the horrific
losses suffered by Syria, certainly the armament they carried was inferior to
missiles carried by lAF fighters. Syrian fighters were armed with AA-2 ATOLL
infra-red heat seeking missiles. These missiles were rear aspect only; they could
only be fired from behind a target. They were comparable to early Vietnam era
American AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles and had similar PK (probability of kill) of
ratios o f about 19 percent. On the other hand, the Israelis employed the latest
generation o f AIM-9 Sidewinders missiles, the AIM-9L. Earlier that year during
the Falklands, British Harriers scored 25 hits for 27 launches against faster, more
maneuverable aircraft in poor weather to achieve a pk of 93 percent. Sunilar pk

http://www.libanmall.com/mam/map.htm
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ratios were achieved by the I s r a e l i s / T h e missile also gave the lAF another
great advantage. The L model Sidewinder was an all-aspect heat seeking missile.
It could acquire, lock on and be fired against a target at any angle, including head
on. Achieving the traditional “6 o ’clock” position behind a target in a dogfight
was no longer needed. The lAF achieved the majority o f its kills as MiG’s closed
with lAF fighters, never giving Syrians pilots an opportunity to maneuver. Hence
most kills achieved by the lAF occurred without the Syrian pilots releasing any
weapons.
Regardless o f these reasons, the Syrian Air Force was defeated. The SyAF
lacked effective training o f both pilots and ground crew. Syrian pilots were
trained in the rigid standard o f the 1970’s Soviet doctrine, one that eschewed the
principle o f domination of the air by sheer numbers. By constantly sending up
available fighters to engage the lAF, Syria followed just that doctrine. It is
important to note however that this tactic also requires a numerical superiority
over the enemy, which the Warsaw Pact would have over NATO, but Syria did
not posses over Israel.
Syrian pilots were trained to rely on GCI for their every movement. As a
result, they failed to exploit any advantage that presented itself, such as the
maneuverability o f the MiG-21 or the blazing speed of the MiG-23. When GCI
control ceased, Syrian pilots lacked the initiative to take the fight to the Israelis.
Soviet doctrines might have worked very well in a war in Europe, The W S
would have held a huge numerical advantage and would be able to sustain great
losses in a European conflict. They would not have had to shoot down every
Hurley
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NATO fïghter-bomber, only disrupt their missions so that Soviet ground forces
could advance. The VVS would have been ready to accept massive losses to
ensure that ground forces achieved their objectives. This was not the case in
Syria. The Syrian Air Force could not sustain massive losses, thus the entire
doctrine o f domination through numbers was flawed.
Even when viewed by their Soviet counterparts, Syrian pilots were poor.
After the 1973 war, the air force was decimated. Most pilots who flew in 1982
were young and inexperienced. They did not fly as many hours as their Israeli or
even Soviet counterparts. When commenting on the performance of the SyAF
during the war, one senior VVS officer noted “it is all very well that GCI
operators should assist us fighter pilots.. .one should not rely on their support for
everything”

Even Soviet pilots knew personal initiative in the air was valuable.

The Israeli domination o f C^, coupled with superior training, intimate
familiarity Avith its geography, and the fact that the lAF had flown over the Bekka
Valley unopposed for years, allowed the lAF to dominate the largest air battle
seen since the end o f the Second World War. Though the MiG-23 did not perform
well during it baptism o f fire, it did not perform poorly either. Rather the support
structure that flew, maintained and controlled it was fatally flawed. The MiG-23
was not inferior, the Syrians were. The war was won through LAF domination of
airspace and was an indicator o f future air-to-air combat. Combat would no longer
be a close maneuvering fight, but rather BVR and head on shots that would
require high levels o f coordination and training to succeed.

Lambeth pg30
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In an ironic twist, the invasion o f Lebanon began with total domination of
Syrian armed forces by Israel, with the lAF achieving kill ratios that are the
highest ever achieved. It did so through technology and training, yet the war in
Lebanon rekindled a civil war within Lebanon and created a guerilla war that
neither the lAF nor IDF were prepared to handle. The war that began in such a
spectacular manner soon became a quagmire, and as Martin van Creveld in his
book The Sword and the Olive observed, it nearly tore the nation of Israel apart.
The Lebanese War became Israel’s Vietnam. It was the only war which Israel did
not win and the first war to see massive dissent within the country. Initial “shock
and awe” victories against a conventional army did not guarantee victory in the
subsequent guerilla war.
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C hapter VIII
Wars o f the 9 0 ’s and the Scoreless MiG-29

The MiG-29 Fulcrum, currently a front line fighter in Russia, Ukraine,
India and many other nations, has not enjoyed much good publicity since it’s
unveiling to the West in 1986. From highly public airshow crashes in England and
France to its dismal performance in places such as Eritrea, Serbia and Iraq, the
MiG-29 has been overshadowed by the more successful and perhaps more
glamorous cousin, the Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker. The MiG-29 has scored no
confirmed kills in aerial combat, except two US civil registered Cessna’s, flown
by anti-Castro Cuban activists, downed by the Cuban Air Force. It has been on the
receiving end o f kills by aircraft from countries as varied as Holland and Ethiopia.
However, despite its fruitless record, the MiG-29 is still regarded as an able
fighter in today’s threat environment. India has recently selected the navalized
version, the MiG-29K, to serve on their new aircraft carrier, the former Russian
Naval Ship, Admiral Gorshokov.

Other Southeast Asia countries are

purportedly looking at the MiG-29 to replace their aging fleets of 1960’s vintage
fighters. Even Peru operates the Fulcrum.
A vindicating factor for the Fulcrum was the German Luftwaffe’s
successftil operation o f an entire squadron of MiG-29’s, until mid 2004. It had
inherited the MiG-29’s from the former East Germany after reunification. German
Fulcrums, flown by well-trained Luftwaffe pilots, were regular as aggressors in
NATO exercises and have become proof positive that the MiG-29 has a place in
Kappan, Rasheed. “Indo-Russian Deal on MÎG-29K Ready” The Hindu Online [India].
February 11, 2001. http://www.hindu.eom /thehindu/2001/02/l l/stories/02110004.htm
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today’s air forces. After fighting the German Fulcrums most Western pilots agree
that, despite some problems, the MiG-29 is a capable WVR (Within Visual
Range) combat aircraft. Some even concede its superiority in that realm over
similar American aircraft.
Its fleet is too large to economically operate, to pay debts to former
satellite nations such as Slovakia, Russia has been using the MiG-29 lending to its
growing popularity. As if to prove the MiG-29 poses a threat, the USAF, through
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program funding, bought twenty-one nuclear
capable MiG-29S’s from M o l d o v a . I n much the same fashion as the MiG-21,
Western companies are beginning to offer upgrade packages to extend the MiG29’s usable lifespan. These efforts have been despite the fact the MiG-29 has yet
to achieve a kill in true aerial combat.
The Fulcrum, bom of the arms race of the Cold War, the Fulcrum is now
at the heart o f the imperiled success o f MiG OKB as they progress into the 2U^
century. The future o f the company relies on the success or failure of Fulcrum
sales in the near future.

The Fulcrum

As the air war over Vietnam unfolded and evolved, the United States was
only one o f the interested parties. The Soviet Union watched intently as tactics
Hehs, Eric. “Schlemming with the Fulcrums, F-16/M1G-29 training in Italy” Code One
M agazine. Lockheed Aeronautics Company, June 1995.
htto://w w w .codeonem agazm e.com /archives/1995/articles/jul_95/july2a_95.htm l

“M oldovan M iG-29 Purchases” National Air Intelligence Center Online, Maxwell Air Force
Base, AL. http://www.wpafb.af.mil/naic/mig29%20purchase.htm

104

and technology began to dictate the next development in aircraft design. It soon
became apparent that dog-fighting, once in the realm o f dinosaurs, was an
essential tool in aerial combat. Beyond Visual Range (BVR) combat proved its
limitations in Vietnam and maneuver combat was included in any new fighter
design format in either countries. American designers built such aircraft as the F16 Fighting Falcon and the F-15 Eagle in response to this new need. Not blind to
the burgeoning trend in aerial combat, the Soviets designed the highly
maneuverable MiG-29 (NATO codename Fulcrum) and the Sukhoi Su-27,
(NATO codename Flanker).
During the early 1970’s, in response to realized inadequacies of frontline
aircraft, the Soviets launched the Perspektivyni Frontovoi Istrebitel or PFl
(Advanced Tactical Fighter) p r o g r a m . S p l i t into two programs, MiG received a
contract to produce a lightweight fighter, equivalent to the US F-16. Sukhoi
received a contract for the heavy fighter to counter the American F-15. As per
requirments by TsKB, the PFl design was to be capable of autonomous
operations from unimproved airfields to achieve tactical battlefield air superiority.
Secondly the PFl was to provide limited escort capability to fighter-bombers over
hostile territory; thirdly it was to have limited ground attack capabilities. All
these requirements were expected on top of the requirement for a highly
maneuverable aircraft.
MiG took note o f designs in the US such as the F-14 Tomcat and FX
program (later the F-15), the TsAGl presented both design bureaus with top secret
Tartar, Easy. “M iG -29 in Study” Fighter Tactics Academ y. December 2003
http ://www. soi. fi/~fta/M iO-29 .htm
Autonom ous meaning free from centralized GCI control
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information gathered from espionage in the

The secret information

included utilizing twin tails, coupled with widely spaced engines, to provide a
lifting body shape similar to the US Navy’s F-14 Tomcat. Thus, both the Su-27
and the MiG-29 shared many design similarities. For MiG, this design was
important for national security, but also internally. The PFl program was the first
design concieved after the death o f Arytom Mikoyan and the retirement of
Mikhail Gurevich. It would be a test o f the bureau under its new chief, Rostislav
Belyakov.
Belyakov joined MiG in 1941, shortly after graduating from the Moscow
Aeronautic Institute. He participated, in most aspects with all design since then
and was a driving force behind the MiG-23 and -25. He was also the liaison
between MiG and the military, industrial plants and government officials.

Thus

Belyakov knew the firm from both a design and business standpoint and assumed
the role o f chief designer shortly after Mikoyan’s death in 1970. As head of the
design bureau Belyakov’s first test was the MiG-29 design, “Product 9” within
the Bureau.
The first flight o f the prototype occurred on October 9, 1977 with MiG test
pilot Aleksander Fedotov at the controls. The next month, the West got its first
look at the MiG-29 when a spy satellite over flew the test airfield at Ramenskoye.
Dubbed the RAM-L by Western analysts, it became the subject o f much
speculation and theory, most o f which was untrue.

Unfortunately for MiG, the

M iG-29’s test period was fraught with problems, stemming from the newly
Butowski 113
Butowski pg 112
166

Spick pg 488
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developed Klimov RD-33 turbofan engines which powered the MiG. Multiple
crashes plagued the program. Some o f these crashes may have resulted in tests to
determine the correct placement o f the engines; the RD-33 was later found to be
very sensitive to disturbed airflow.

Two prototypes crashed in 1978 and 1980

respectively and the MiG-29 did not enter service with the W S until 1983, while
the PVO did not receive its first M iG-29's until 1984.
The West received its first close-up view of the MiG-29 in 1986. Between
Julyl and July 4, six MiG-29’s flew to Rissala Air Base in Finland as part of an
ongoing cooperative exchange program between the Soviets and Finns. This
program also brought the MiG-23 and the MiG-2 Ibis to the West for the first time
in 1983 and 1974 respectively. After a display by MiG pilot Vladimir Chilin, it
was apparent to all onlookers that the MiG-29 was a highly maneuverable aircraft,
an observation that would be built upon two years later. The MiG-29 also landed
in the impressively short distance o f 450 meters, proving it could operate from
dispersed airfields.
In 1988, quite unexpectedly, two MiG-29’s appeared at the Famborough
Airshow. Also present was chief designer Belyakov and his deputy designer
Mikhail Waldenberg. This was a first for a Western airshow! The MiG-29
performed both solo and joint routines, putting on a display that impressed
Western onlookers. O f particular interest was a sustained 9 g, 360® turn in 12.5
seconds and another 360° turn with a radius o f 700 meters, at speeds approaching

Spick pg 487
Butowski 114
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8 0 0 k m / h . However, the most impressive display was saved for last, when test
pilot Anatoily Kvotchur performed a tail, or “Cobra” slide at extremely low
altitude. Though not particularly dangerous when performed at altitude, the MiG29 demonstrated it ability to fly vertically to a stop, slide backwards with its nose
still in the vertical position and recover quickly to a flyable speed. Western
onlookers were amazed when this dangerous maneuver was performed at an
altitude less than 1,000 meters. According by the MiG designers this maneuver is
a feasible combat tactic as it breaks the lock of Doppler radar systems. However
in later years it was discovered not be viable with a full compliment of fuel and
weapons on the aircraft.

Sketch o f MiG-29
Butowski pg 114
Tartar, Easy. “M iG-29 in Study” Fighter Tactics Academ y. December 2003
http://www.sci.fi/~fta/M iG-29.htm
^^^http://www.geocities.com/aboutaircraft/mig29.htm
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It was at the

annual Paris Airshow in 1989 that the MiG-29 gained

notoriety. During a routine air demonstration, MiG test pilot Kvotchur
experienced a bird strike in the starboard engine at 513ft from the ground. This
loss o f power, at an already low speed, led to a stall situation and forced Kvotchur
to eject from his stricken aircraft. The image o f the MiG-29’s nose impacting the
ground, milliseconds before fire engulfed the aircraft, appeared the world over.
Kvothchur’s escape from the doomed MiG also showed one the Fulcrums one of
the many innovative feature to the Western world.
Ejection seat technology stagnated in the Soviet Union until the late
1970’s. The new Zvezda K-36 ejection was a leap forward in aircraft egress
technology for the Soviets, and the MiG-29 was the first to incorporate it. In fact,
experts consider the K-36 seat to be on par, or even superior, to Western seats. In
point o f fact, the seat is now being produced under license in Connecticut.

The

seat was also seen in action during the 1993 Royal International Air Tattoo in
Fairford, England; two Russian MiG-29’s collided whilst performing an aerial
display.
By showing the MiG-29’s incredible agility and, tragically, its K-36
ejection seat, these early airshows gave the West an unparalleled, close look at the
MiG-29. During the 1988 visit to Finland it was revealed that the aircraft has
large doors in front o f the air intakes that close while the aircraft was on, or near,
the ground. Air for the engines was supplied by vents on top of the aircraft during
Connecticut, Department o f Economic and Community Development. “Governor Rowland
Announces IBP Aerospace Facility W ill Create 200 Jobs in East Hartford” December 1, 1998.
http://www.ct.gov/ecd/cwp/view.asp?a= 1104& q=249982
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this period. Speculation ran wild as to the reason for this design feature, but
deputy designer Waldenberg stated it was simply to avoid FOD (Foreign Object
Debris) from entering and damaging the engines when the aircraft was operating
from unimproved airfields. Additionally the MiG-29 can also fly at speeds up to
800km/h with the doors closed, perhaps to prevent bird strike damage.
Two very interesting features o f the MiG-29’s fire control system were
also revealed. First, the 30mm Gryazev/Shipunov GSh-30-1 single barreled
cannon is extremely accurate, thanks to it’s coupling to a laser range finder and
the Doppler radar system. Though the MiG-29 only carries 150 rounds (or five
seconds o f firing), few rounds are necessary before a hit can be attained.
Secondly, and more importantly, the MiG-29 pilots can use a helmet mounted
sight to track enemy aircraft. This feature is very valuable when combined with
the R-73 (NATO codename AA-11 ARCHER) missile featuring thrust vectoring
capabilities. This system allows a MiG-29 pilot to engage an enemy without using
telltale radar, giving the MiG-29 less possibility o f being detected. However, the
true advantage of the system is its flexibility. It allows the pilot to shoot at an
aircraft up to 45° off bore sight of the nose. This ability reduces the amount of
maneuver required before a shot can be taken, the entire point o f dogfighting.
German pilots who flew the MiG-29 in Luftwaffe service after reumfication said
that, “The helmet mounted sight is a real advantage when it comes to
engagements requiring a visual id e n tific a tio n .D e s p ite the advantages offered
by the MiG-29, the German pilot then illuminates one of the key problems with
Spick pg 489
Spick pg 490
Hehs
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aircraft. “It offers no advantage in BVR (Beyond Visual Range) engagements,
however, unless you can enter a short range fight, which is not likely against as
AMRAAM^^^-equipped opponents.” This observation would besome painfully
evident for MiG-29 pilots over Serbia and Iraq.
Indeed, the original MiG-29 suffered in many areas, including radar. MiG29 A’s did not have a viable BVR capability. It’s radar was not powerful enough
nor could it carry long range missiles. Alpha (NATO phonetic alphabet for A)
model Fulcrums also lacked a fly by wire system, instead they relied on
antiquated hydraulics that increased pilot fatigue and compromised
maneuverability in high G situations. Also not included on the A model were
hardpoints for external fuel tanks. This was something which was desperately
needed owing to the small internal fuel supply. Later models such as the M1G-29S
(SE for export) alleviated most o f these issues with the incorporation of fly-bywire systems, external fuel tanks, improved radar and the ability to fire the new
BVR R-77 Vympel missile.
The ergonomics o f the cockpit were not improved upon in the S model,
something which German pilots, having flown Western aircraft, had difficulty
dealing with. According to Luftwaffe Capt. Michael Raubbach “Just to get a
simple lock on and fire a missile may take up to half a dozen hands off stick
switches.

German pilots complained the switches were not laid out in a logical

manner. This was a problem as most basic operations required an inordinate
amount o f movement within the cockpit, by MiG this rectified somewhat with the
Advanced Medium Range Air to Air M issile fielded by NATO as the A IM -120. The missile is
radar guided and capable o f accurate long range interceptions.
Hehs
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introduction o f the MiG-29SMT, which incorporated a glass cockpit and was, too
a large degree, compatible with Western avionics.

Maintenance is also not up to

Western standards; a replacement o f the RD-33 engines being required every 400
hours.
Most o f the world’s MiG-29s that have seen combat are Alpha models,
thus the shortcoming were quite apparent. However, as the Luftwaffe JG73
squadron flying the MiG-29A have shown, the MiG-29 is still a formidable
aircraft. According to its own pilots the MiG is capable of holding its own against
such aircraft as the F-16 and F/A-18 Hornet. As one F-16 pilot pointed out
“whoever makes the first mistake (in a close range fight) loses”

In fact one

pilot claims it to be “more then capable”. T h o u g h the German pilots have
proved the MiG-29 to be a worthy aircraft, it is only such when in the hands of a
capable, well trained pilot. Though dreadful the combat record o f the MiG-29
proves without a doubt the value o f training and proficiency.

Spick pg 492
Hehs, In comparison the F-16 Pratt and Whitney’s 200 series engines require replacement
every 4,000 hours.
Hehs
Hehs
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The Fulcrum in Combat: A Story o f Woe

The baptism o f fire for the Fulcrum was by no means glorious. The Gulf
War o f 1991 was a one-sided victory for the Coalition forces against Iraq. The
war in the air was no different. Coalition forces followed the model of airspace
domination set forth by the Israelis during 1982. On the first night of the war,
January 17, 1991, US and Coalition aircraft attacked airfields, radars, GCI sites
and command and control bunkers. They destroyed Iraq anti-aircraft defense
network, crippled its ground based fighter control system and decimated most
airfields very quickly. The night o f January 17 was also the first combat for the
MiG-29 Fulcrum.
After strikes by F-I17 Stealth fighters focused on C^ targets in Baghdad,
F-111 and F-15E’s began attacking the air defense network around the capital
city. Top cover was provided by USAF F-ISC’s and USN F-14 ’s. During the
ingress to the target, two Iraqi fighters managed to get airborne and challenge the
attackers. However a comedy o f errors ensued. As the lead MiG-23 crossed in
front o f his wingman that was flying a MiG-29, the wingman fired and destroyed
his comrade. Just after his ffatricidical maneuver, the MiG-29 flew into the
ground.

To say the least, this was not a elegant combat debut for the MiG-29.

G ulf War Air Power Survey Volum e II: Operations and Effects and Effectiveness. US
Government Printing Office. Washington D.C. 1993 pg 125
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An Iraqi MIG-29A
As the F-15E’s and F-11 T s egressed from attacking their targets, another
group o f fighters rose from H-2 or H-3 air base. AWACS (Airborne Warnings and
Control Systems) picked up the fighters closing with a group of F-15’s heading
for a tanker to refuel. The top cover F-15C’s, (callsign Pennzoil and Citgo) were
vectored to intercept. At sixteen miles, the target was identified as a lone MiG-29
and the lead F-15 fired a long range AIM-7 Sparrow missile. Apparently, the MiG
pilot did not realize he had been fired upon, and continued to climb, taking no
evasive action as the missile struck and destroyed the aircraft. Later that night,
two more MiG-29’s were downed by Citgo and Pennzoil flights.
Two days later, on January 19, the MiG-29 made another poor showing.
Captains Caesar Rodriguez and Craig Underhill were performing a daylight
fighter sweep near the Baghdad area when they detected two MiG-29’s. As the F15 flight tracked the two MiG-29’s they were bounced by another two undetected
MiG-29's. Very quickly one the MiG’s obtained missile-lock on Rodriguez. For
some reason the MiG did not fire, though Rodriguez was “well within his

artwork courtesy o f Tom Cooper ACIG.org editor
G u lf War Air Power Survey vol II pg 126
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range”

Rodriguez performed a maneuver to break lock and used his F-15’s

ECM (Electronic Counter Measures) gear to spoil any shot; “I kept him off until
Underwood would target and take him out.”^*^ Underwood obtained a lock and
fired a single AIM-7 that destroyed the MiG behind Rodriguez. With this threat
eliminated, Rodriguez engaged the remaining MiG-29 in a classic turning
dogfight. The fight began at 8,000ft and very quickly descended to 300ft. Finally,
when neither pilot could obtain an optimum firing position, the MiG performed a
split-S maneuver, miscalculated and flew into the ground. Rodriguez was credited
with a kill by maneuver. Two MiG-29’s were also killed by F-15C’s on February
15 as they attempted to flee eastwards to Iran.
American F-15’s were credited with five MiG-29 kills They had also
watched two crash into the ground whilst attempting an intercept. The subject of
much discussion, the reasons for these two crashing is generally blamed on the
heads down configuration o f the MiG-29 A radar and fire control system. It was
not possible to both, fly the aircraft in an offensive manner, track a target, and fire
a missile and while still watching outside the cockpit. This problem was later
described by German Luftwaffe pilots as they transitioned to the MiG-29.
The air war during the first Gulf War progressed much the same as Israeli
operations over the Bekka Valley. Coalition aircraft controlled the airspace and
decimated the Iraq air defense network. When opposing aircraft did manage
takeoff to intercept, they lacked coherent control and a good situational picture of
the surroundings. Thus, the Iraqi pilots were easy targets for US fighter sweeps.
Grant, Rebecca. “The M issing A ces” Air Force Magaize, The Journal o f the Air Force
Association Online. Sept 2004 vol 87 no 9. http://www.afa.org/magazine/Sept2004/0904aces.httnl
G u lf War Air Power Survey vol II pg 127
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Additionally, the Iraqi experience during the Iran-Iraq war gave advantage to the
Coalition. During that conflict neither side had attempted to dominate the air they
instead relyed on their respective armies to achieve victory in the battlefield. It
was Saddam Hussein’s decision to put his aircraft in supposed bombproof
shelters, riding out the initial air strikes that crippled the Iraqi air force for the
remainder o f the war. Hussein relied on his vast air defense network to blunt
coalition airstikes, rather than his air force.
The MiG-29 did not fair well during the Gulf War due to the low skill
level o f its pilots, the vast destruction of the defense network, and the high
proficiency level o f coalition pilots. These same variables would doom the MiG29 in its next combat performance over the skies of the Balkans.
Yugoslavia received its first MiG-29’s in 1987 from the Soviet Union.
These were not new aircraft, in fact they were some of the first MiG-29’s
produced. They had been flown by the VVS and then put into storage prior to
their sale to Yugoslavia. When Yugoslavia broke up in 1991, the MiG-29’s were
under the control o f Serbia (Serbia at the time, still referred to itself as
Yugoslavia). During the civil wars that racked the Balkans in the 1990’s, MiG29’s were employed to fly CAP (Combat Air Patrol) missions along the borders
of Austria, and later, flew numerous ground attack missions against the Bosnians
and Croatians. Croatia and Bosnia claimed to have destroyed at least four MiG-

Keaney, Thomas A and Eliot A. Cohen. G ulf War Air Power Survey Summary Repoit. (US
Government Printing Office. 1993) pg 56
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29’s during the war, but post war analysis by NATO revealed that all fourteen
aircraft survived the civil wars/^^
When Serbia was confronted by NATO in 1999, the condition of all MiG29’s was very poor. All MiG-29’s were assigned to one squadron, the 127^^
Fighter Aviation Squadron based at Batajanica airfield near Belgrade. The pilots
of this squadron were only averaging only twenty flying hours a year, hardly
enough to stay proficient.

The MiG-29’s were maintained very poorly, with

rarely more then five aircraft deemed flight ready. Thus, when ordered by
Belgrade to sortie against incoming NATO fighters, only five aircraft were
serviceable and were spread out to among dispersed airfields.
On March 24, 1999, during the early hours of Operation Allied Force,
three MiG-29’s were scrambled from Batajanica airfield to intercept incoming
allied fighter-bombers. As the flight gained altitude the MiG-29’s were picked up
by a British E-3D Sentry AWACS aircraft patrolling over the Adriatic. Also in the
area were four Royal Netherlands Air Force F-16AM’s assigned to CAP duty
around Belgrade. After being vectored into the area o f the MiG’s, the four F16AM’s detected the lead aircraft on radar. The lead pilot shot an AIM-120
AMRAAM eighteen kilometers from the target. Soon after he reported a “large
fiery explosion” and was informed by the AWACS that the MiG had disappeared
fi*om radar.

This was the first Dutch air-to-air victory since the Second World

188 “Yugoslav and Serbian M iG -29s” Air Combat Information Group Jourpah Oct 2003.
htto://www.acig.org/artman/publish/articie 380.shtml
Daw es, Alan “Surviving NATO Shootdowns” Air Forces Monthly. (July 1999 pg 70-71) pg 71
Jok, Joris Jannsen. “H ow Dutch F-16A M ’s shot down a M iG -29” Janes Defence Weekly. May
1999. http://www.janes.coni/defence/news/kosovo/jdw990401 0 I n.shtml
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War. The other two M iG-29’s exited the area at high speed and avoided contact
with the Dutch F-16’s.
Luck ran out quickly for the two escaping Fulcrums, however, as they
were tracked by AWACS aircraft. USAF Col. Caesar Rodriguez, who had
downed two M iG’s during the Gulf War flying a F-15C, was vectored to the two
remaining MiG-29’s. One of the MiG-29’s was on course to intercept a flight of
incoming F-117 Stealth Fighters. According to the MiG-29 pilot. Major Iljo
Arizano, he detected a number of targets, among them an F-117. Firing a missile
at the Stealth Fighter, he missed. Whilst moving to reengage it, Arizano’s aircraft
was struck by a missile in the rear fuselage and entered an uncontrollable spin. As
smoke filled the cockpit Arizano decided to eject and landed in a vineyard
southwest o f Pristina.

He was downed an AIM-120 AMRAAM fired by Col

Rodriquez.
Just as this engagement concluded, USAF Capt. Michael Showers
detected two M iG-29’s departing the airfield at Batajanica. Capt. Showers was
escorting a flight o f F-117 Stealth Fighters, when the two MiG’s began an
intercept on his flight; Showers engaged them with two AIM -120 AMRAAMS’s.
However both missiles missed their mark. As the MiG’s closed with Showers he
described the situation, “I didn’t think I had a choice of turning and running away,
you’ve got a MiG-29 running around in the area, and there is a chance he could
get lucky and find a S t e a l t h . S u r p r i s i n g an F-117 pilot who was only 2,000ft
from in front o f his aircraft. Showers launched another AMRAAM, which found

Air Force Monthly July 1999 71
Grant
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its mark, and destroyed a MiG-29 piloted by Major Nebojsa Nikolic. Nikiolic
later claimed he had engaged and fired an AA-8 Aphid missile at his attacker but
this was never verified.
Two days later, two M iG-29’s were scrambled to intercept a high flying
NATO reconnaissance aircraft that was flying north west over Serbia. As they
climbed to intercept the aircraft, both MiG-29’s began to experience malfunctions
Avith their radar systems. Directed by GCI the two aircraft attempted a visual
intercept o f the NATO aircraft as it crossed the Bosnian border. As their radars
malfunctioned, they failed to detect a flight of USAF F-15C led by ANG Capt.
Jeffery Hwang. The Mig-29’s were both shot down by AIM -120 AMRAAMS
before they could take evasive action.

Air Force Monthly July 1999 71
Air Force M onthly June 1999 21
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Photos o f MiG-29 downed by Capt. Hwang over Bosnia
all pictures o f downed M iG -29 are courtesy o f Sgt. Colby Jackson who visited the wrecked
while serving with SFOR as part o f the Montana 163^ National Guard in 2002
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Despite the fact that they had failed to score a single kill against Allied
aircraft, Serbian MiG-29"s continued to challenge Allied aircraft. The last MiG-29
kill o f the conflict occurred on May 4, 1999 when two F-16CJ’s engaged a single
MiG-29, destroying it very quickly with another AMRAAM.
Intercepts by MiG-29’s during Operation Allied Force were doomed to
fail from the beginning. Flight hours were as low as twenty a year and no pilot
had the proficiency enough to engage NATO pilots on an equal footing.
Additional, the MiG-29’s, were in a poor state of repair. Of a fleet of 14, only six
were able to fly. O f those MiG-29’s, a major malfunction was reported in either a
radar or fire control system during every flight. By the spring o f 2004, Serbia
could not maintain the aircraft and MiG-29 operations ceased.
The skies over eastern Africa would be the next combat arena for the
Fulcrums as Ethiopia and Eritrea were fighting over land disputes stemming from
the Eritrean war o f independence. Since 1990 Ethiopia and Eritrea had long
endured a simmering border conflict over the Badme area. Hostilities erupted
numerous times and in 1997 Ethiopia, with the help of the Russian mercenary
group Rosvoorouzhenie, began to import Su-27 Flanker fighters. Eritrea, lest it
fall behind in the arms race, purchased a number o f MiG-29A from a Ukraiman
mercenary company. Due in part to friction within the Rosvoorouzhenie
Company, Russians within the company supported the Ethiopians, while the
Ukrainians supported Eritrea! The Ukrainians broke from the firm and worked

Cooper, Tom “II Ethiopian Eritrean War, 1998-2000” Air Combat Information Group
Journal.(Sept 2003) http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_189.shtml
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exclusively for Eritrea. Eritrean pilots were sent to Ukraine for a crash course on
the MiG-29. This was a great step up as they previously flown fairly simple
Italian Aermacchi M B.339’s. In February of 1999 tensions flared into open
hostilities.
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During the morning o f February 25^^' 1999, four MiG-29 A ’s, piloted by
Eritrean pilots, intercepted two Su-27’s flown by Russian mercenaries near the
disputed area. The Fulcrums bounced the two Russians, firing a salvo of AA-10
missiles. All missed. After evading the missiles, the Russians turned and engaged
the Eritrean’s. The M iG-29’s could not evade the faster Flankers and one was shot
197
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down, reportedly flown by the Eritrean Air Force commander. Brig. Gen. Habte
Zion Hadgu.^^®
The next day, a lone Su-27, flown by a female Ethiopian pilo,t came
across an unarmed Eritrean two seat MiG-29UB, apparently out on a training
flight. After a good deal of maneuvering, the female pilot gained firing position
on the MiG. In one of the more unusual events in aerial warfare, the Ethiopian
contacted the MiG, requesting he relent to be escorted to an Ethiopian airfield.
Upon hearing the other pilots voice, she realized it was her former instructor, a
pilot who had defected and was now flying for Eritrea. After a lengthy discussion,
the Ethiopian shot her former instructor down with 30mm gunfire. She was the
first woman to score an aerial victory in a jet aircraft.
Hostilities continued and on March 18, a pair of MiG-29's were shot down
by Russian flown Su-27’s. This victory led to the temporary withdrawal of
Eritrean MiG-29’s from the battlefield. However, on May 16, 2000 they made a
reappearance to challenge Ethiopian Su-27’s again. In the ensuing battle one
MiG-29 was shot down quickly, while the other crash landed at the airport in
Asmara after being hit by an R-73 from one o f the Ethiopian Flankers. This was
the last known operational use of the Eritrean MiG-29’s.^^^
Interesting in this conflict was the battle between the MiG’s and it W S
stable mate, the Su-27. Though the Su-27 is larger and supposedly less
maneuverable, nearly every battle was a turning fight, one in which the MiG was
supposed to excel. Also apparent were the skills of the Russian mercenaries.

Cooper
Cooper
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especially against relatively poorly trained Eritrean pilots. This plays poorly for
MiG OKB as they struggle to increase sales against their competitor Sukhoi. If
MiG is to increase sales, its aircraft must perform well, especially against it prime
economic competition. Performance in well trained and experienced hands, such
as the German Luftwaffe or Indian Air Force, has shown the MiG-29 Fulcrum to
be a worthy adversary; however in the hands of an inexperienced or poorly
supported pilot it has no chance to prove its worth.
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C hapter IX
Conclusion

Many lessons can be drawn from M iG’s aircraft combat performance.
These lessons include the value of highly trained pilots and ground personnel, a
competent C3 structure and situational awareness in combat. Without any of these
factors and when faced by a force proficient in all aspects of them, pilots are
doomed to failure.
Many Western aviation authors and researchers are convinced of the
supremacy of Western aircraft. They have often looked upon Soviet/Russian
aviation as a generation behind not a threat to Western aircraft. This is a
dangerous assumption which must be avoided. Any aircraft with a proficient pilot,
regardless o f the state of technology, should be regarded as a threat. The Western
aircraft design industry, as well as the air force it supplies, is dominated by
technology. Though pilot training in the US and other Western countries is the
best in the world, the industry and tacticians focus on the role of technology in
warfare. While playing a large role in success on the battlefield, technology is not
the end all it is sometimes portrayed as. The human brain is still the fastest, most
advanced part o f any weapons system.
Soviet aircraft have had a reputation as being inferior to their Western
counterparts. In part this is due to a history of combat failures, examples of which
have been examined in this study. However, as any historian knows, the danger
lies in taking something out o f the context of time or place. All current MiG
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designs were created during the Cold War, a time of tense nerves and nuclear
brinkmanship. Whereas Western design firms marketed and relied on foreign
sales, Soviet era OKB s had but a single customer. Any foreign sales were
negotiated by the Soviet government and were not the concern of the company.
MiG OKB was tasked with equipping the VVS and PVO with frontline fighters
and fighter/bombers; it did not design aircraft for foreign customers. Therefore the
OKB's designs were quite specialized. Had a war occurred in Europe involving
the Soviet Union and NATO, Soviet aircraft might well be considered in a
different light.
The Soviet Union relied on superior numbers on the battlefield for victory.
The W S and PVO possessed far more aircraft then NATO, though not as
advanced. The role of the Soviet Air Force differed from its Western counterpart.
The W S and PVO were to support the advancing army by disrupting NATO air
operations. They were expected to sustain heavy losses, offset by their numerical
superiority. Luckily, this scenario never occurred. However, along with military
hardware the tactics that would have been employed by the W S were exported to
Soviet client states resulting in poor performance by Soviet designed aircraft.
The air war over North Korea placed the M iG-15 in an environment for
which it was designed, point defense of static targets from fighters and bombers.
When coupled with quality Soviet pilots, the MiG-15 excelled in this role.
However, though flying the same aircraft, relatively untrained North Korean and
Chinese pilots suffered heavy losses in the same role. This was a direct result of
poor, insufficient pilot training.

126

When M iG’s rose to meet American fighters and bombers over Vietnam
their initial success was limited due to lack of training. As the war progressed the
NVAF, aided by restrictions imposed on American pilots by the US government,
greatly improved their performance. They broke from traditional Soviet tactics
and developed their own indigenous ones, suited to the varied combat over
Vietnam. This was especially important to the NVAF as they did not possess
numerical superiority. North Vietnam also possessed a very advanced GCI system
that vectored and provided information to pilots quickly and effectively.
Eventually the NVAF produced thirteen aces, due in part to the pilot’s initiative
and ability to operate independently from the Soviet model. Ten years later Syrian
pilots discovered the fallacy of exporting a tactical doctrine ill suited for the
environment.
When Syrian and Israeli aircraft engaged one another over the skies of the
Bekka Valley in 1982, the Soviet system became the laughing stock of air forces
the world over. The Syrian Air Force suffered heavy losses to the guns and
missiles of the lAF for numerous reasons. Though the SyAF was flying highly
advanced and capable M iG-23’s, they could not be employed in an effective
manner. Syrian pilots were not proficient in ACM, lacked all personal initiative in
battle and did not maintain C3 control. They were highly dependent on the Soviet
system of GCI to intercept lAF aircraft. When this was lost, so too was their
situational awareness as they had not been taught the skills necessary to continue
the battle independently. The M iG’s over the Bekka Valley were destroyed in
record number due to organizational and pilot error, not because the hardware was
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inferior. Unfortunately for MiG, its aircraft continued to suffer throughout the
1990’s at the hands of inexperienced pilots.
The loss of M iG-29's in both Gulf War I and Yugoslavia was the direct
result of poor pilot skill. In one aforementioned case, a MiG-29 shot down his
wingman, and then crashed into the ground while being engaged by American F15’s. Over Bosnia and Serbia, MiG-29*s were not serviced to a combat ready
status and sent into battle deaf, dumb and blind. No aircraft can be expected to
survive in such an atmosphere.
Despite the horrendous combat record of MiG-29’s there is hope. The
German Luftwaffes demonstrated unequivocally during the 1990’s showed that
with a well-trained pilot a MiG-29 could defeat Western aircraft. The key to this
success is not an innovative fire control system or excellent maneuverability, but
rather the human brain within the cockpit.
In aerial combat the most significant factor is still the human factor. To
win in aerial conflicts, countries must have necessary resources and willingness to
train pilots effectively. They cannot rely on technology alone to dominate the
battlefield. Though MiG aircraft have not performed since 1950 as well as their
Western counterparts, the fault lies not in their design, but in their
implementation. A multimillion-dollar aircraft is worthless without a
multimillion-dollar pilot, a fact that many countries fail to understand.
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Epilogue
The Future of MiG: Can a Soviet Era OKB Survive in Today’s Market
Economy?

MiG is struggling to cope with the former Soviet Union’s new economic
situation. Gone is the VVS and MoD guidance for aircraft design. Instead Russian
OKB’s must design aircraft marketable to a broad audience. Gone also are the
vast amount o f funds available under Soviet rule. Now OKB’s must lobby for
money from either governments or private sources, much like their Western
counterparts. Today the production lines o f MiG are at a near standstill, producing
aircraft to replace fleet attrition losses. The design bureau is still producing and
researching upgrade packages for aircraft such as the M iG-21, -29 and -31, but is
falling behind other companies in particular, MiG has taken a backseat to lAI
(Israeli Aircraft Industries) which is marketing upgrade packages for many
Eastern European Fishbed operators. MiG has made a number o f partnerships
with the hope o f staying competitive.
After the fall o f the Soviet Union in 1991, MiG merged with its key
production facility, MAPO (Moscow Aircraft Production Organization)^®^
creating MIG-MAPO.^®^ The group acquired the helicopter company, Kamov, and
sought foreign partners such as Singapore based. Agio Countertrade. Business is
still slow, perhaps due to MiG ties with former head bureau chief, Belyakov.
Norman, Iain. The Fall o f MiG or H ow Sukhoi Stole the Spotlight. Unpublished Manuscript
MIG, with a capital I, now stands for M oscow Industrial Group, however the aircraft design
bureau is still known as MiG.
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Belyakov backed the coup which attempted to oust Yeltsin from power and relied
very heavily on friendships in the old Soviet VVS to maintain funding for aircraft
p r o g r a m s . H i s retirement from the company in 1995 is construed some as a
blessing. MiG’s main competitor, Sukhoi, has done remarkably well in the post
Soviet era, It has sold its premier fighter the SU-27 (and variants thereof) to many
countries outside the old Soviet sphere o f influence. Unlike Sukhoi, MiG has not
learned the value and skill o f marketing.
During the years o f drastic inflation right after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, there were reports that the-ehief o f the Sukhoi bureau traded sport aircraft
for Toyotas. By doing this, Sukhoi avoided the drastic deflation o f the ruble.
Dollars that were made were securely banked in the West. Sukhoi has made a
point to bring its Su-27 to as many large airshows as possible to wow crowds and
diplomats alike with its fantastic maneuverability. Sukhoi changed the historical
method o f simply assigning a letter at the end o f the aircraft to denote a new
version (i.e. MiG-29S/SE/K etc), instead they renumber each new derivative (i.e.
Su-30, Su-33, Su-35 all variations of the Su-27), thereby making the aircraft seem
like a new design.^^^ Sukhoi has, for all practical purposes, unseated MiG as the
premier Russian design OKB. All is not lost for MiG though, and there may be
hope for the struggling company.
India has recently acquired nearly 30 M1G-29K aircraft to operate firom
their former Soviet aircraft c a r r i e r . M a l a y s i a has also recently purchased MiG-

Tartar
manuscript o f Iain Norman
Kappan, Rasheed. “Indo-Russian Deal on M iG -29K Ready” The Hindu Online Flndial.
February 11, 2001. http://www.hindu.eom /thehindu/2001/02/l 1/stories/02110004.htm
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29’s and MiG is seeking to expand into commercial aircraft production with the
M iG-110. MiG also is developing the stealthy MiG 1.44, designed as a fifth
generation fighter, although this project seems to be stalled. As o f early 2003, the
MiG Corporation was offering the M iG-21-93 upgrade program, the MiG-23-98
upgrade program for this maintenance intensive aircraft, a cockpit upgrade for
MiG-27’s, the MiG-29 as the basic A and advanced S version, the carrier borne K
version and finally an the MiG-31 as a whole aircraft for China and the VVS/PVO
or as an upgrade package to existing airframes.^®^
MiG must stay competitive with Sukhoi in order to survive. Efforts abroad
at marketing and upgrading current versions will be the company’s only salvation.
The Su-27 was in respect a poor choice for many nations that have already bought
it. The aircraft is expensive to buy and to maintain, whereas the MiG-29 is
cheaper and less maintenance intensive. MiG must effectively market the strong
points o f its current offering, much as it did with the Indian Navy and continue to
research and develop its military and commercial designs. If MiG does not do
this, it will not survive. In thirty years MiG may have made an admirable
comeback or it will be only an entry in history books like so many o f its
predecessors. If MiG dies, with it goes the legacy o f the premier designer o f the
Cold War Soviet era and a name that so many people worldwide associate with
fighter aircraft. The design bureaus death Avill be a sad day indeed.

manuscript o f Iain Norman

131

A p p e n d ix

All Flow charts from General Dynamics via Piotr Butowski and Jay Miller
OKB MiG: A History o f the Design Bureau and its Aircraft. Aerofax Press,
Leicester 1991

FLOW CHART OF SOVIET MILITARY AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION
iMfAcr

iCClNCIlUAnOM

H O tlA ltM tlll

couNCu or
WNIlTiHS

OUVVSlAtHrOACtt
APPROVAl

I
COOCIPTUAt STUOIH
NO VVS

moiTOlUAC
COONCIt OP

SPfcirtcAriONS
SPATS COINMSSIOA

1 MTK Of C o r

M

K

RIN VVS

1

cMir

OfOlflOfM

»

APPROVAl

PRC PROTECT

MOO

MOOUCIMllfV

GERERAISTAff

REO illU IIIO rt

SOVOCE SiLiCTHW

h

-

■0
VVS

It

roLiritfoo

]—

coMPATmurv

.—

WUTAOY (tOUtTAlAl COMMItflM

OfHCRCUSTOMRS

HflA lACAOPlOTI

oirfosc

OKI 01API

COttttCIl

Ul
HAP
HOD
OMTIOP

• PUOHT RESEARCH IRSTITWTE OP TMO
- MIRMTRV o r AVIATIORIROOSTRV
-MINISTRY o r DiriRSE
- THE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IRSTITOTI
FOR AVIATION UCHNOUOV ARO
OROARIEATIOR OF PROOllCTlON
Oil
- RESEARCH MTSTITUTE
OfK
-SCIERTIflC TECHNICAL COMMITTEE
OKI
- PROTOTYPE 0ESI6I (CwMncÜMl
lOREAO
TiKi
- CENTRAL OEMOR SVREAO
VVS
-A IR FORCE
CO FH .
-COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
VOYERPREO - PROCUREMENT OFFICER
TTZ
-TACTICAL TECHNICAL
iEQUIREMENTI \
OTOE
- OPERATIONAL TEST & EVALOATIOR
Oil
-MAINAOMINSTRATiON
STANOAHOI

CONSV

MIITAAV RESEARCM

wsTtruTfsoraoo
ACAOEMV Of SCIEOCSS
■ASIC RESEARCH WSKTUnS

PROTOTYPE COO
SIRUCTlONOmTWC

AVttTIOR RESEARCH
MTITUTCSOr MAP
STATE
ACCEPTAO(E lOAIlS

MATCRUiSOCOMPORERTS

piooucTiOH occnioo
I r

STATE

TRAümOO

■AnRIAUFROttVtAM

0»
POeOOAM
TEAM

EROIRES PROM TRAM

PROOOCriOO
TRAM IIM I
nOROMATlOO

MIllTARV lOUIPMERT
PROM OIPfRSE WRISTEHIES

OMTIOP
PACTOOY

OEPIOVMERT

"vvs

1

132

MINISTRIES OF CIVIL AVIATION AND DEFENSE
MOVP

MOD

MINISmV
OF

MINISTRY
OF
DEFENSE

CIVIL AVIATK>N

GENERAL STAFF

RV8N

WS

VMF

TRAINING

VTA

WARTIME AIRUFT RESERVE
ASSIGNED TO VTA

PA

SV

PVO S tn n y

TRAINING

VOV

DA

TACTICAL AIR
SUBORDINATE TO SV

133

THE MIO OENEALOQY

fVLCmM

Y«-1S2AnjPPEff*

MKM1 <2SM)
FOOIOUND

M iO -2S (Y »M l
FOXBAT

*lea■^9 FAFMER

MiQ-10 un

Muoocr

MIÛ-16 FAQOr

MKMMAOO

134

B ib lio g ra p h y

Aces and Aerial Victories: The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 19651973. The Albert Simpson Historical Research Center Air University and Office
o f Air Force History. 1976.
Ashkar, Riad and Kassim Jaafar. “Military Options in the Middle East” The
Journal o f Palestine. Vol 7, No.4 (Summer, 1978), pg 99-114
Arkhipova, M. Reaktivnye samolety vooruzhennvkh sil SSSR i Rossii. MoscowMinsk. AST-Kharvest, 2002
“Balkan Air Power Survey” Air Forces Monthly. June 1999. pg 74-80
Belenko, Viktor. MiG Pilot. Avon Press, New York. 1983
Belyakov, R.A and Marmain, J. MiG: Fifty Years of Secret Aircraft Design. US
Naval Institute Press. Annapolis, Maryland. 1994
Black, Ian. Tornado Pilot. Osprey. London, 1994
Boyne, Walter J. Beyond the Wild Blue: A History of the US Air Force, 19471997. St Martins Press. New York. 1997
Boyne, Walter J. Weapons of Desert Storm. Publications International.
Lincolnwood, Illinois, 1991
Butkowski, Piotr and Miller, Jay. OKB MiG: A History o f the Design Bureau and
its Aircraft. Aerofax Press, Leicester, England, 1991
Cohen, Elizier. Israel’s Best Defence: The First Full Story o f the Israeli Air Force.
Airlife. Shrewsbury, 1994
Connecticut, Department of Economic and Community Development. “Governor
Rowland Announces IBP Aerospace Facility Will Create 200 Jobs in East
Hartford” December 1, 1998.
http ://www.ct.gov/ecd/cwp/view. asp?a= 1104&q =249982
Cooper, Tom “II Ethiopian Eritrean War, 1998-2000” Air Combat Information
Group Journal. Sept 2003 http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article 189.shtml
“Corporation History” RAC MIG Company Website
www.migavia.ru/eng/corporation/?tid=4

135

Dawes, Alan “Surviving NATO Shootdowns” Air Forces Monthly. July 1999 pg
70-71
Dorr, Robert F, Jon Lake and Warren Thompson. Korean War Aces. Osprey
Publishing, London, 1995
Elward, Brad and Peter Davies. US Navy F-4 Phantom II MiG Killers: 19651970. Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2001.
Fleck, Michael USAF Lt. Col. “Continuities in Four Disparate Air Battles” MA
Thesis, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. June 2003
Futrell, Robert Frank. The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953. Office of
Air Force History. Washington D C. 1983
G ulf War Air Power Survey Volume II: Operations and Effects and Effectiveness.
US Government Printing Office. Washington D C. 1993
Gordon, Yefim. Russian Air Power. Airlife, Shrewsbury, UK. 2002
Gordon, Yefim, and Vladimir Rigmant. MiG-15: Design, Development, and
Korean War Combat History. Motorbooks International. Osceola, WI. 1993.
Grant, Rebecca. “The Missing Aces” Air Force Magaize, The Journal of the Air
Force Association Online. Sept 2004 vol 87 no 9.
http://www.afa.org/magazine/Sept2004/0904aces.html
Gunston, Bill, Editor. Jane’s Aerospace Dictionary 3^^^ Edition Jane’s Publishing,
Surrey, England
Gunston, Bill and Gordon, Yefim. MiG Aircraft Since 1937. US Naval Institute
Press. Annapolis, Maryland. 1998
Hallion, Richard P Storm over Iraq. Smitsonian Institituin Press, Washington and
London, 1992
Hehs, Eric. “Schlemming with the Fulcrums, F-16/MiG-29 training in Italy” Code
One Magazine. Lockheed Aeronautics Company, June 1995.
http://www.codeonemagazine.com/archives/1995/articles/iul 95/iuly2a 95.html
Hurley, Mattew C IC USAF A, “The Bekka Valley Air Battle, June 1982: Lessons
Misleamed?” Aerospace Power Journal, Winter 1989 URL
<http://vsrww.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/api/api89/hurlev.html>
Jackson, Paul, Editor. Jane’s All the Worlds Aircraft 2003-2004. Jane’s
Publishing. Surrey, England, 2002.

136

Jok, Joris Jannsen. “How Dutch F-16AM’s shot down a MiG-29” Janes Defence
Weekly. May 1999.
http://www.ianes.com/defence/news/kosovo/idw9904Ql 01 n.shtml
Kappan, Rasheed. “Indo-Russian Deal on M1G-29K Ready” The Hindu Online
rindial. February 11, 2001.
http://www.hindu.eom/thehmdu/2001/02/l 1/stories/02110004.htm
Keaney, Thomas A and Eliot A. Cohen. G ulf War Air Power Survey Summary
Report. US Government Printing Office. 1993
Knez, Saso and Joe Brenan. “Honchos” Air Combat Information Group Journal.
October 2003 http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_315.shtml
Lake, Jon. Janes How to Fly and Fight the Mikovan MiG-29 Fulcrum. Harper
Collins, London, 1997
Lambeth, Beniamin.Moscow’s Lessons from the 1982 Lebanon Air War. RAND.
Project Air Force Report. Santa Monica, CA 1984
Lavorskii, Alexsander. ed. Znamenitye samolety. Moscow: Aviapanorama, 2003
Michael, J.H Taylor. Editor Jane’s Encyclopedia o f Aviation: Volume Four.
Jane’s Publishing. London 1980
Moyer, William W, General USAF (Ret). Air Power in Three Wars (WWIL
Korea, Vietnam). Department o f the Air Force, 1978.
“Moldovan MiG-29 Purchases” National Air Intelligence Center Online, Wright
Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.
http://www.wpafb.af.mil/naic/mig29%20purchase.htm
Morris, John “On the Record with Maj. Gen. Staffan Nasstrom, Chief o f Swedish
Air Force Material Command.” Aviation Weeks ShowNews Online. September
1998. http://www.aviationweek.com/shownews/today/newsmkl4.htm
Nelson, Denny, LT Col. “Soviet Air Power: Tactics and Weapons Used in
Afghanistan” Air Univeristv Review. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. pg 31-43
Norman, Iain. The Fall o f MiG or How Sukhoi Stole the Spotlight. Received
online via correspondence with author.
Niccolle, David and Tom Cooper. Arab MiG-19 and MiG-21 Units in Combat.
Osprey Publishing. Oxford. 2004

137

Overy, Richard. How the Allies Won the Wan Norton and Company. New YorkLondon. 1995
Peebles, Curtis. Dark Eagles: A History of Top Secret US Aircraft Programs.
Presidio. Novata, CA. 1995
Sokolovskii, V.D. Soviet Military Strategy. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica.
California, 1963
Spick, Mike ed. The Great Book o f Modem Warplanes. Salamander. London.
2002

Summers, Harry G. Historical Atlas o f the Vietnam War. Houghton Mifflin,
Boston and New York. 1995
Tartar, Easy. “MiG-29 in Study” Fighter Tactics Academy. December 2003
http://www.sci.fi/~fta/MiG-29.htm
Toperczer, Istvan. M iG-17 and MiG-19 Units o f the Vietnam War. Osprey
Publishing, Oxford, 2001
Toperczer, Istvan. MiG-21 Units o f the Vietnam War. Osprey Publishing. Oxford
Publishing, 2001
Unitied States Pacific Fleet, Headquaters of the Commander in Chief. F-8
Weapons Performance Against the M iG-17 Aircraft. San Fransico, 1966
Van Creveld, Martin. The Sword and the Olive. A Critical History o f the Israeli
Defense Force. Public Affairs, 1998.
Vlad, Danut. “Whatever happened to .. .Romania’s Floggers?"^ Air Forces
Monthly. June 2004. pg 80-86
Vogel, Steve “The Pilots of Fighter Wing 73 Used to Fly on Opposite Sides o f the
Iron Curtain. Now They Fly in the Same Squadron” Air and Space/Smithsonian
Magazine. June/July 1995
http://www.airspacemag.com/ASM/Mag/Index/1995/JJ/motl.html
Whiting, Kenneth R. Soviet Air Power. Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force
Base, 1985
Yakolev, Aleksander. Notes o f an Aircraft Designer. Foreign Language
Publishing House, Moscow. 1972
Youngblood, William. MiG Aliev: The Fight for Air Superiority in Korea. GPO,
Washington D C 2000

138

“Yugoslav and Serbian MiG-29s” Air Combat Information Group Journal. Oct
2003. http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_3 80.shtml
Zhang, Xiamong. “China and the Air War in Korea, 1950-1953” The Journal o f
Military History Vol 62, No.2 (April, 1998) pg 335-370.
Zhang, Xiamong Red Wings Over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air
War in Korea. Texas A&M Press, College Station, TX, 2002

139

